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The 2008 Beijing Olympics represents a golden opportunity
for the brand-conscious sportswear industry to associate its
products with the cherished Olympic brand. For a costly, but
manageable sponsorship or licensing fee, a sportswear com-
pany can infuse its athletic shoes and clothes with the lofty
Olympic ideals of fair play, perseverance and, most important-
ly, winning.  
By linking their brands with the Olympic Games, as well as
other sporting events like the Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA) 2008 Euro Cup, sportswear companies
hope to reach for the gold in sales, market share and brand
recognition. And if the past is any guide, these major sporting
events should prove extremely profitable for some of the
major players in this global industry. 
But there is another side to the story. Before the 2004
Summer Olympics in Athens, the Play Fair at the Olympics
Campaign – the biggest international worker rights mobiliza-
tion of its kind ever undertaken – brought the world’s atten-
tion to the underside of the sportswear industry: the abysmal
working conditions endured by the young women and men,
and children, who make the shoes, jerseys, footballs and
other items in contract factories and subcontract facilities
around the world.
Flash forward four years, with the Beijing Olympics upon the
horizon, and it’s time to ask, “What, if anything, has
improved?” 
What Play Fair researchers found
Based on interviews with over 320 sportswear workers in
China, India, Thailand and Indonesia, as well as reviews of
company and industry profiles, published and unpublished
reports, newspaper articles, web sites, and factory advertise-
ments Play Fair researchers found that substantial violations
of worker rights are still the norm for workers in the sports-
wear industry. 
“I am exhausted to death now…. None of us
have time to go to toilet or drink water. Even so,
we are working without rest and are always
afraid of not working fast enough to supply
soles to the next production line. The supervi-
sors are pressuring and nagging us all the
time. We are tired and dirty. We work without
stop and we are still reproached by the super-
visors.”
Worker making New Balance shoes, Dongguan, China.
6Despite more than 15 years of codes of conduct adopted by
major sportswear brands, such as adidas, Nike, New Balance,
Puma and Reebok, workers making their products still face
extreme pressure to meet production quotas, excessive,
undocumented and unpaid overtime, verbal abuse, threats to
health and safety related to the high quotas and exposure to
toxic chemicals, and a failure to provide legally required
health and other insurance programs. 
Play Fair researchers also found that wages for sportswear
workers are still well below a local living wage. Even where
governments raised the legal minimum wage or sportswear
brand buyers attempt to impose limits on overtime, Play Fair
researchers found evidence of employers finding new ways to
evade their responsibilities. 
For example, when the Chinese government raised the mini-
mum wage in Dongguan province in order to account for a
skyrocketing inflation rate on basic goods like food, employ-
ers at many of the athletic footwear factories studied by Play
Fair found ways to nullify the increase. Some employers raised
production targets, thereby reducing or eliminating produc-
tion bonuses, a significant portion of worker incomes. Others
introduced new charges for food, lodging or other services.
Some of the workers interviewed now receive less income
than before the minimum wage increase.
In some cases, Play Fair researchers discovered, workers are
not even receiving the legal minimum wage, despite working
12-13 hours a day. As well, in a number of the factories stud-
ied, there was evidence of employers falsifying factory records
to mask the fact that employees were being forced to work
excessively long and illegal hours and were not receiving the
legal overtime premium pay.    
Home-based workers stitching soccer balls in Jalandhar, India
told Play Fair researchers that piece rates have remained stag-
nant for the last five years, despite local inflation rates last
year estimated at between 6.7% and 10%. Depending on the
type of ball, a home-based hand stitcher makes between
US$0.35 and US$0.88 per ball, completing two to four balls a
day. Home-based workers also face a total lack of income
security. During months when orders are low, households are
often plunged into debt to money lenders. 
“We have no savings so we have nothing left during emergen-
cies,” said a 50-year-old soccer ball stitcher. There are few if
any safety nets available for homeworkers: sickness or an
accident can amount to a catastrophe. “I have lost my wife’s
gold, which I gave as security to a moneylender and could not
repay,” he said. “Once I even rented my cooking gas cylinder
to arrange some money for a health emergency suffered by
my wife. The situation is similar for all of us. One of my friends
even sold his blood to get some extra money to meet an
emergency.”
Three hurdles to overcome
Across the global sportswear industry, workers manufacturing
sports apparel, footwear and soccer balls all report the same
kinds of problems. These findings are not new. A particular
business model, lack of incentives, competing interests, insti-
tutional inertia and other factors have often negated even the
best efforts to fix the endemic problems that continue to
plague this industry. 
Rather than merely rehashing a litany of abuses, this report
seeks to identify solutions to these persistent workplace prob-
lems, focusing on three central hurdles that, if not overcome,
will inhibit the industry’s ability to make real progress on other
issues in the future. 
These include: 
• Lack of respect for freedom of association and the right to
bargain collectively; 
• Insecurity of employment caused by industry restructuring;
and
• Abuse of short-term labour contracting and other forms of
precarious employment.
If the sportswear industry is serious about changing the way
business is currently done, there is an urgent need to take
immediate steps to address these three central issues. 
Freedom of association and collective bargaining 
The lack of respect for workers’ right to freedom of association
and to bargain collectively impedes worker efforts to resolve
workplace problems as they arise and to negotiate long-term
improvements in wages and working conditions.  
The dominant attitude and practice in this industry is so
biased against the development of trade unions that we
believe a more proactive approach is needed to create a pos-
itive (rather than just neutral) climate for unions. We believe
that companies should adopt a positive approach towards
the activities of trade unions and an open attitude towards
the organizational activities of workers.
This report documents considerable obstacles workers face
when they try to exercise their right to freedom of association
and collective bargaining, including:
• Dismissal of union leaders and supporters;
• Refusal by factory management to recognize and negotiate
with unions;
• Closures of or reduction in orders to unionized facilities; 
• Movement of production to jurisdictions where freedom of
association is legally restricted; and
• Management promotion and selection of unrepresentative
“worker committees.”
7Factory closures
The rash of factory closures that has accompanied industry
restructuring over the past few years contributes to a climate
of fear amongst workers and suppliers, feeding the myth that
any efforts to improve conditions will only lead to more job
losses. When workers face employment insecurity, they are
less likely to take steps to challenge abusive practices. 
While a few brand-sensitive sportswear companies are willing
to discuss how to minimize the negative impacts of restructur-
ing and consolidation, the vast majority refuse to even consid-
er whether they have an obligation to justify their decisions to
workers or communities that will be negatively affected. 
Closures should only occur when a factory is no longer able to
sustain itself economically, and all other options to rescue the
business have been exhausted. But it’s not always easy to dis-
entangle the responsibility for economic decisions that affect
the viability of a particular factory. 
Suppliers and/or buying agents using multiple factories in
one or more countries make choices about which factories
receive which orders, affecting the viability of one or another
facility. Buyers also, either by decision or simply by neglect,
fail to support facilities that have been more compliant with
labour standards – especially those with collective bargaining
agreements – leading to closures. Because we are dealing
with global supply chains, a narrow assessment of one isolat-
ed facility’s economic viability is not sufficient to rationalize a
closure. A true assessment of a facility’s economic viability
must also take into account the order patterns from buyers,
whether prices paid by buyers are sufficient to support labour
rights compliance at a facility, and the finances of the parent
company.
Growth in precarious employment
Although comprehensive global data across the industry is
not available, in recent years, unions and labour rights organ-
izations have reported an increasing use by supplier factories
of successive short-term employment contracts and third-
party employment contract agencies. Play Fair documents
some of these trends in this report. 
The growing use of short-term contracting and other forms of
precarious employment is denying workers their social secu-
rity and other legal entitlements, discouraging worker organ-
izing, and undermining the enforcement of labour regulations,
which too often do not apply to non-permanent workers. 
The problem is that the sportswear industry is addicted to
flexibility. In the prevalent sportswear business model, retail-
ers, brands, and transnational suppliers seek to maximize
their ability to change not only the styles and products being
produced, but the factories or countries in which the goods
are being made, all in pursuit of the quickest, most reliable,
best quality and, of course, cheapest production. 
It’s no surprise, therefore, that sportswear factories would
seek to flexibilize their workforces. As long as the global sys-
tem of sportswear production remains unstable, there will be
a drive to download the bulk of the risk involved in competing
for business and orders. Those that can no longer download
the risk – the workers at the bottom of the supply chain – end
up bearing the brunt of the instability in the system. 
The fourth hurdle: a living wage
Our research also indicates that despite increasing work pres-
sure and excessive working hours, worker incomes remain, on
the whole, well below a living wage. While industry leaders
have been willing to take action in some cases to ensure that
workers receive the legal minimum wage or prevailing indus-
try wage, there has been very little action to date to ensure
that workers’ wages are sufficient to meet basic needs. 
Just as workers at the bottom of the supply chain have been
forced to bear the lion’s share of risks associated with the
industry’s demand for flexibility, workers have also been
forced to shoulder the costs associated with consumer
demand for low prices. 
Soccer ball stitchers in Pakistan, for example, report that they
receive between US$0.57 and US$0.65 for each ball they pro-
duce, a rate that hasn’t changed in six years even though the
consumer price index rose by 40% over that period. Garment
workers in Cambodia earn an average of US$70 to US$80 a
month, including overtime and bonuses – not enough to pro-
vide a worker and family with a decent standard of living. In
Bangladesh, where massive worker protests in 2006 led to a
long-overdue increase in the minimum wage to 1,662.50Tk
(US$24.30) a month, the real value (after inflation) of their
monthly wage is now worth even less than the 1995 minimum
wage. In Turkey, the prevailing industry wage in the garment
sector is estimated to be less than half the living wage.
Responsibility for achieving wage gains in global sportswear
supply chains is more widely distributed than it might be in a
national industry producing for domestic consumption,
because global sportswear production takes place in a con-
text of: 
• Unstable buying relationships; 
• Difficulties with national wage setting mechanisms due to
footloose sourcing and investment; 
• Lack of respect for freedom of association and collective
bargaining; and 
• Low price expectations by consumers, brands and retailers.
For these reasons, a coordinated effort to increasing wages in
the sportswear industry must be developed. It should focus
initially on major suppliers and relatively stable factories
8where a critical mass of buyers have a long-term relationship
with the supplier factory and all are willing to take steps to
ensure that workers receive wages that fall within the range of
living wage estimates for the region.  
Concrete actions and measurable targets
In this report, Play Fair outlines four focus areas where we
believe real changes can be made that will open up the indus-
try to sustainable improvements on labour rights. To serious-
ly address the lack of freedom of association and the right to
bargain collectively, precarious employment, and the impacts
of factory closures, and to raise incomes to a level that meets
workers’ basic needs, sportswear companies will need to take
a series of concrete, measurable actions in close collabora-
tion with multi-stakeholder initiatives, trade unions, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and governments.   
A small sample of the actions and targets set out in this report
include:
• Sportswear brands should require suppliers to adopt  a pol-
icy on freedom of association and communicate this to the
workers in the form of a written “Right to Organize
Guarantee.” This should be done at a minimum of 30% of a
brand’s suppliers by Vancouver 2010, and 100% by London
2012. 
• By Vancouver 2010, sportswear brands and retailers should
provide measurable incentives to factories that have a col-
lective bargaining agreement with an independent trade
union. Such incentives could include: 
- Preferential order placement;
- Long-term, stable supply contracts; and
- A measurable CBA premium in unit prices.
Sportswear suppliers must ensure that, by Vancouver 2010, at
least 95% of workers engaged in the company’s core business
are employed under open-ended or undetermined duration
contracts, and that:
• Any use of fixed duration contracts is in response to a clear-
ly defined plan justifying their use; 
•Any workers on fixed duration contracts are provided the
same salary and benefits accorded to permanent workers
performing the same work; 
• Once a short-term employee has been hired on a fixed dura-
tion contract twice by the same employer, or for two years,
the employee is automatically hired on an undetermined
duration contract with the third contract. 
By Vancouver 2010, buyers should report publicly on the com-
pany’s policies for supplier/vendor selection, management,
and/or termination, including new source approval process,
linking of supplier CSR performance with sourcing decisions,
and strategy for managing impact of exiting factories. Multi-
stakeholder initiatives should require this of their members.
By Vancouver 2010, buyers should undertake an independent
review of prices paid to suppliers. Such a review should deter-
mine whether the prices paid are sufficient  to allow compli-
ance with international labour standards and provide for an
expected wage for workers that meets workers’ basic needs. 
By Vancouver 2010, buyers should provide information
regarding the unit price paid by the buyer to the supplier on a
confidential basis to trade union  representatives engaged in
collective bargaining with suppliers.
Buyers should commit to the attainment of a living wage in at
least 25% of supply factories by London 2012, by:
• Collaborating with other buyers (possibly through a multi-
stakeholder initiative) to identify suppliers where participat-
ing buyers collectively control more than 75% of production
on a regular basis;
• Facilitating the establishment of negotiating structures to
enable factory management and trade union(s) to consoli-
date the living wage element  into the existing pay structure
at those factories;
• Individually negotiating with factory management on meas-
ures needed to meet a living wage target proportional to
each buyer’s share in production.
The Challenge
Four years ago Play Fair asked the industry to take up the chal-
lenge of making real, substantial improvements in labour
standards compliance by the Beijing Olympics. With the
Beijing Games just months away, progress has been limited at
best. If the sportswear industry – buyers, suppliers and the
multi-stakeholder initiatives that include them as members –
is truly serious about addressing the issues outlined in this
report, it must demonstrate its willingness to undertake con-
crete action to meet measurable targets to ensure that when
the next Olympic Games come around in two and four years’
time, workers can expect real improvements in their condi-
tions rather than two or four years’ more talk about vague
commitments. 
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The 2008 Beijing Olympics represents a golden opportuni-
ty for the brand-conscious sportswear industry to associate
its products with the cherished Olympic brand. For a cost-
ly, but manageable sponsorship or licensing fee, a sports-
wear company can infuse its sports shoes and clothes with
the lofty Olympic ideals of fair play, perseverance and,
most importantly, winning.  
By linking their brands with the Olympic Games, as well other
sporting events like the Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA) 2008 Euro Cup, sportswear companies
hope to reach for the gold in sales, market share and brand
recognition. And if the past is any guide, these major sporting
events should prove extremely profitable for some of the
major players in this highly competitive global industry. 
The 2004 Olympic Games in Athens were credited with
boosting share prices for Nike, adidas and their Taiwanese
sportswear supplier Yue Yuen by 14.7%, 11.9% and 8.8%
respectively from their levels three months before the
games to their levels three months after.1
The 2006 World Cup boosted soccer ballI sales for adidas,
the Cup’s Official Sponsor, by 30% over 2005 levels. The
company’s overall sales rose 20% to US$2.33 billion in the
second quarter of 2006.2
That’s no surprise. The 2006 World Cup boasted a cumula-
tive TV audience of 26.29 billion viewers worldwide over
the course of the tournament, almost four billion of those
in China alone.3 Over 150 million people around the world
are expected to tune in to each of the 2008 Euro Cup
games, matching or exceeding the Euro 2004 cumulative
audience of 7.9 billion viewers, a massive audience for
I. In this report we use the term “soccer ball” to refer to the ball used in the game; many countries use the term “football” to refer to the same item.
When referring to the game itself, we use the more internationally recognized term “football”.
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sportswear advertising.4 And the Beijing Olympic
Organizing Committee (BOCOG) estimates the cumulative
worldwide TV audience for the Beijing Olympics will hit 40
billion.5
Access to a worldwide TV audience and a short-term spike
in sales are not the only reasons sportswear companies are
so eager to attach their brands to the Beijing Games. The
audience within China is of even more strategic impor-
tance, and sportswear brands are willing to pay top dollar
to reach it.
Asian markets growing
China’s sporting goods market is currently valued at
between US$4.2 and $5.6 billion annually6, and analysts
predict that annual growth in consumer spending on
sportswear will stay in the double digits in the coming
years.7 Unlike the North American and European sports-
wear markets, China’s market has almost unlimited room
for growth. 
Nike’s sales in the Asia-Pacific region during the first quar-
ter of 2007, for example, were up 22% compared to the
previous year.8 While the company’s sales are still growing
2% a year in the US, its sales in Europe, Asia and Latin
America are growing by double-digits.9
By the end of 2006, Nike controlled an estimated 15%
share of the sportswear market in mainland China. Adidas
was close behind with 12%, and Chinese manufacturer and
brand Li Ning had 10%.10 Asian competitors, such as
Mizuno (which planned to more than double its outlets in
mainland China between 2006 and the end of 2010),
China Honxing Sports, Anta Sports, and China Sports
International, have also captured significant shares of the
Chinese sportswear market.11
Recognizing that China is now its second largest market,
generating an estimated US$1 billion in revenue in 2007,12
Nike is already present in over 3,000 retail outlets in the
world’s most populous country,13 and is reportedly opening
a new store in China every day.14
Adidas has over 2,500 outlets in 300 Chinese cities, which
the company hopes to expand to over 5,000 by 2010.15
Adidas CEO Herbert Hainer told investors recently that he
expects to achieve US$1.56 billion in annual sales from
China by that year.16
Li Ning has 4,300 retail outlets in China, many in smaller
cities where Western brands have a lesser presence.17 Li
Ning’s products sell at prices 30% to 40% less than those
of major brands like Nike and adidas.18 Anta Sports
Products Ltd. has 4,000 retail outlets in China.19 And Yue
Yuen, the world’s largest maker of sports shoes, boasts of
a sevenfold increase in sales in China between 2005 and
2007, growing from 520 own-operated retail outlets in
China to 3,000.20
Demographics are behind this surge of interest in Asia.
With a population of 1.3 billion people, more than half of
whom are under 30 (and therefore the ideal target market
for sportswear),21 China holds enormous potential for
increased sportswear sales.
It’s no wonder sportswear companies are sparing no
expense to secure Olympic sponsorships. 
Sponsorship deals are big money
It is estimated that winning the prize to become the Beijing
Olympics Official Sponsor cost adidas between US$80 mil-
lion and $100 million in cash, services, products and uni-
forms – and that’s not including the company’s individual
team and athlete sponsorships.22 Adidas has also signed
on to sponsor the 2012 London Olympics, paying over
US$201 million, with the right to outfit the British team for
Olympic Games in Beijing, Vancouver (2010), and London
(2012).23
A worker making adidas shoes in China would
have to work over four months to buy a ticket to
the Opening Ceremonies of the Beijing
Olympics.
Adidas spent $200 million to sponsor the 2006 World
Cup.24 As well, the company is now the official sponsor for
the UEFA [Union of European Football Associations] 2008
Euro Cup, North American Major League Soccer (with a 10
year contract worth US$150 million),25 and the 2010 World
Cup in South Africa.26
Not to be outdone by its main competitor, Nike has report-
edly cornered over 80% of the contracts to supply shoes
and clothes for professional Chinese basketball teams.27
The company’s annual budget for advertising and sponsor-
ships was US$1.9 billion in 2007.28
That’s a lot of money being spent on image making. 
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Some Olympic Team Sponsorships
Adidas Australia
Belgium
China (2008 Beijing Games)
France
Germany
UK (2008, 2010, 2012)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ASICS Netherlands
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bosco Sport Russia
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
China Hongxing Sports Ltd. North Korea
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Freddy Italy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) Canada
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intersport Austria
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Li Ning Argentinean Men’s 
Basketball team
China (shooting, 
gymnastics, diving and 
table tennis teams)
Spain
Sweden
Sudan
Tanzanian track and field
team
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nike USA
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Peak Iraq
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Polo Ralph Lauren USA
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Speedo Australia
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Switcher Switzerland 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Who’s not benefiting?
Before the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, the Play Fair
Alliance brought the world’s attention to the underside of
the sportswear industry: the abysmal working conditions
endured by the young women and men, and children, who
make the shoes, jerseys and other items in contract facto-
ries and subcontract facilities around the world.
WHO WAS THE PLAY FAIR ALLIANCE? 
The Play Fair Alliance included Oxfam, the
Clean Clothes Campaign, and Global Unions. It
organized the 2004 Play Fair at the Olympics
Campaign. For more information, see
www.fairolympics.org. In 2007, some of the
members of the Play Fair Alliance initiated the
Play Fair 2008 campaign (see
www.playfair2008.org).
The Play Fair Alliance documented horrendous working
conditions in the industry, including poverty wages, exces-
sively long hours of forced and underpaid overtime,
exploitative terms of employment, bullying, sexual harass-
ment, and physical and verbal abuse. Through interviews
with workers in Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, and
Turkey, the Alliance demonstrated that these conditions
were not confined to a few bad factories or countries, but
were “normal” conditions faced to varying degrees by
sportswear workers the world over.II
Reports of “sweatshop” abuses in the sportswear industry
were not new, and, admittedly, some sportswear compa-
nies had taken initial steps to address some of these abus-
es prior to the Athens Games. But, as the Play Fair Alliance
pointed out, those efforts were limited, either because real
business practices have not matched lofty statements on
corporate values, because labour standards commitments
have not been effectively implemented, or because the
best efforts of some brands have been undermined by
poor practices of competitors using the same factories. 
II. For the full report, see “Play Fair at the Olympics,” available at: www.fairolympics.org/background/olympicreporteng.pdf
Joyful Long Sports (Dongguan) Manufactory  in China:
Factory main entrance and recruitment banner. (March 2008)
Play Fair rushes the field
In response to the general lack of progress on eliminating
worker rights abuses in the industry, in 2004 the Play Fair
Alliance asked sportswear companies across the sector to
adopt a Programme of Work that set out concrete steps
the industry could take to improve conditions for the work-
ers who manufacture their products. The Alliance invited
companies to engage in sector-wide efforts to improve
conditions rather than continuing to act alone. 
Flash forward four years to 2008, and it’s time to ask,
“What, if anything, has improved?” 
In this report, the Play Fair 2008 Campaign attempts to
answer that question, and puts forward a series of
demands and a timeline to achieve real, concrete improve-
ments. Play Fair researchers interviewed over 320 workers
from factories in China, India, Indonesia and Thailand
about their wages, experiences, and working conditions.
We also used secondary materials including company and
industry profiles, published and unpublished reports,
newspaper articles, web sites, and factory advertisements.
Lastly, we conducted a workshop in Bangkok, Thailand in
November 2007 involving labour rights activists from
around the world to solicit their input. Through this
research, we hope to present a rough overview of some of
critical issues currently plaguing workers in the sportswear
industry globally.
In Chapter I, we provide an overview of the sportswear
industry, identify the key players, describe how they inter-
act, and examine how those structural relationships can
either help or hinder efforts to improve working conditions
in the industry. 
In Chapter II, we review the 2004 Play Fair Alliance
Programme of Work and assess how leading sportswear
companies have responded to date.  
In Chapter III, we focus in on four critical issues where
progress has been limited and much more needs to be
done: the right of workers to freely associate and to bar-
gain collectively, the need for wages that meet basic needs,
increasingly precarious employment relationships that
undermine workers’ rights, and the impact of the wave of
factory closures on workers and communities. We explain
why progress on these four issues is critical to improving
working conditions as a whole, and present actual cases
that demonstrate how much still remains to be done.  
In Chapter IV, we take a closer look at the role of the world’s
biggest sports shoe manufacturer, Yue Yuen, a company
that produces 17 percent of the world’s footwear. 
Chapter V delves into the world of soccer ball production,
leaving aside the well-known efforts to curb child labour in
Pakistan to focus instead on the lesser known production
centres in India, China and Thailand, where working condi-
tions and wages for adult workers have fallen short of the
goal. 
Chapter VI takes its motto straight from one of the world’s
most successful sportswear brands, adidas: “Impossible is
Nothing!” Despite company claims that improving wages
and working conditions is complex and progress difficult,
we demonstrate that very real improvements can be made
if companies have the political will to do so. 
Lastly, Chapter VII puts forward a set of concrete actions
with measurable targets that, if implemented, would raise
the bar on worker rights in the industry worldwide by the
next Olympic Games in Vancouver in 2010 and London in
2012.
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Joyful Long Sports (Dongguan) Manufactory  in China:
Workers taking rest and playing snooker game after lunch 
(outside factory building). (March 2008)
Joyful Long Sports (Dongguan)
Manufactory  in China:
Recruitment notice and simple factory
introduction outside the factory 
building. The paper on the top right 
corner states that factory wage range
from 850 to 1,800 yuan. 
(March  2008)
The global sportswear industry doesn’t just make sporting
goods, shoes and apparel. It makes money, and lots of it. 
The value of the global athletic footwear and apparel mar-
ket was pegged at US$74 billion at the end of 2005. While
the sports shoe market is smaller than the athletic apparel
market, it is growing over twice as fast.29 Almost 60% of the
sports shoe market is dominated by two companies, Nike
and adidas. These same companies also control around
overdue increase in the minimum wage to BDT1,662.50 a
month(US$24.30), the real value (after inflation) of their
monthly wage is now worth even less than the 1995 mini-
mum wage.III
In many countries, workers have seen no increase in the
minimum wage, and some workers struggle to obtain even
the legal minimum in wages, overtime pay and other statu-
tory benefits.
 Table 1: Before Tax Sportswear Profits in US Dollars31 % increase
Company 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004-07
Nike $1,450,000,000 $1,859,800,000 $2,141,600,000 $2,199,900,000 51.72%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adidas $646,770,453 $849,299,213 $877,573,672 $1,088,393,584 68.28%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Puma $448,435,711 $523,972,232 $453,959,272 $510,944,031 13.94%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yue Yuen $300,005,000 $307,616,000 $375,604,000 $386,647,000 28.88%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ASICS $64,755,447 $100,270,835 $147,816,138 $203,735,461 214.62%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Under Armour $16,300,000 $19,700,000 $39,000,000 $52,600,000 222.7%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Li Ning $14,739,267 $22,593,546 $36,803,693 $57,407,416 289.49%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BasicNet/Kappa $4,815,120 $5,111,355 $4,561,441 $11,220,470 133.03%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18% of the sports apparel market. Puma controls around
7% of the athletic footwear market.30
The brands that dominate the global sportswear industry
are making handsome profits. Since the Athens Olympics
in 2004, Nike, Puma, adidas, Kappa, ASICS, Yue Yuen,
Under Armour and Li Ning have all increased their profits
by a healthy margin – some by over 200% (see Table 1).
In contrast, the workers who manufacture the shoes,
apparel, soccer balls and other sporting goods are, in
many cases, making even less in real wages today than
they were ten years ago. In Bangladesh, for example, where
massive garment worker protests in 2006 led to a long-
Who calls the shots?
How is it possible that in an increasingly profitable indus-
try, those at the bottom of the supply chain have seen so
little improvement in wages and benefits? 
Part of the answer lies in the structure of an industry that
downloads the risks and costs of business to those that have
the least power in the global supply chain – the predominant-
ly young, women workers who devote 10-14 or more hours a
day to making sportswear for the consumer market. 
The path up the global supply chain from the workers who
make sportswear products to the brands and retailers who
III. The 1995 minimum wage of BDT930 adjusted by an increase in the National Consumer Price Index of 90.7% between 1995 and September 2007. 
13
A profitable industry
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market and sell them is made up of multiple layers. As a
general rule, the higher up the chain you go, the stronger
the bargaining power of the company occupying that tier,
and the greater the profits earned. 
Brands and retailers that occupy the top tier of the sports-
wear supply chain have the most direct relationship with
consumers. Major brands may sell their products through
retail stores like Footlocker, Wal-Mart, Intersport or
Carrefour, or they may own their own retail outlets and flag-
ship stores. Giant brands and retailers hold a great deal of
power in the supply chain because of their ability to set
delivery schedules and prices paid to suppliers further
down the chain. 
Brands typically concentrate on designing, promoting and
marketing sportswear items, and subcontract the actual man-
ufacture of the products to others. Subcontracting may be
coordinated by a buying agent – a company that organizes
production for the brand through a number of subcontracted
relationships, but doesn’t actually manufacture the product
itself – or orders can be placed directly with a supplier. 
Suppliers may be large, transnational companies with fac-
tories around the world, in which case they may have some
power to bargain with buyers over work schedules and
prices. But suppliers may also be smaller companies that
own one or two factories and have little bargaining power
and tight profit margins. 
Some suppliers subcontract portions of production even
further down the chain to small sewing workshops or
home-based facilities. At the bottom end of the supply
chain, subcontractors and homeworkers have little control
over the price they are paid or the conditions under which
they work. 
Whether they work in supply factories, subcontract facili-
ties or as homeworkers, garment workers receive little
compensation for the wealth they produce, have little bar-
gaining power and, as we shall see in Chapter III, face enor-
mous obstacles when they try to organize trade unions in
order to negotiate improvements in their wages and work-
ing conditions. 
WHERE ARE SPORTING GOODS BEING 
MANUFACTURED?
Production of sports shoes is concentrated in
four main countries: China, Vietnam,
Indonesia, and Thailand. For Nike, 35%, 31%,
21% and 12% of its total footwear is produced
in these countries, respectively.32 Ninety per-
cent of all athletic footwear is produced in
these four countries. China’s share of total
global athletic footwear production is 58%, its
nearest competitor being Indonesia, at 12%.33
Soccerball production is also highly concen-
trated, with an estimated 80% of soccer balls
being manufactured in Sialkot, Pakistan,34 with
most of the remainder being produced in
India, China and Thailand. 
Sports apparel production is more dispersed
geographically. Nike, for example, produces
apparel in 36 countries, although a majority of
its apparel is produced in Asia.35 While adidas
reports that its products are manufactured in
65 countries, production is concentrated in
China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey and
Vietnam.36 ASICs contracts production to facto-
ries in 31 countries, though over half of those
factories are located in China.37 Puma reports
using factories in 47 countries, with the major-
ity located in China, Vietnam, India, South
Korea, Thailand and Malaysia.38
Sports shoe production underwent a dramatic
restructuring and consolidation in the 1980s
when quotas on those goods were eliminated.
Since the phase-out of apparel quotas under
the Multi-Fibre Arrangement at the end of
2004, a massive restructuring of apparel pro-
duction has also been taking place. This
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restructuring has not yet run its course, owing
in part to import restricting safeguards placed
on China by the USA and EU. These safeguard
measures are set to expire at the end of 2008.
One likely result of the quota phase-out will be
consolidation of production with fewer large
suppliers for major orders – although perhaps
not to the same extent observed in the
footwear sector.
Transnational manufacturers
Some sportswear suppliers are Asian-based transnational
corporations that specialize in the organization of predomi-
nantly export-oriented, low-skill, low-wage, labour-intensive,
and high-volume manufacturing across a range of indus-
tries. These companies, which employ many thousands of
workers, have direct supply relations with major Western or
Japanese brands and retailers. Unlike the branded corpora-
tions, which are highly visible in high-streets, mass media
advertising and sporting events like the Olympics, these
companies remain unknown to consumers. But they play an
increasing role in deciding where, and under what condi-
tions, apparel and footwear are manufactured. 
These Asian transnationals have graduated from being
suppliers at the bottom end of the supply chain to control-
ling their own global supply chains. Many have set up pro-
duction sites in mainland China, other parts of Asia, Latin
America and Africa. Some have moved up the supply chain
by offering customers integrated value-added services,
which include design and development, development of
prototypes and models, etc. 
This consolidated manufacturing model is already preva-
lent in the athletic footwear sector, and there are some
prominent examples in the apparel sector as well. As the
apparel industry restructures, we can also expect to see
transnational manufacturers controlling significant shares
of sports apparel production. 
Consolidation in sportswear
Sports shoes: Sports shoe brands typically source their
footwear from a handful of key suppliers in order to take
advantage of economies of scale and integrated services.
Nike, for example, divides much of its shoe production
among five main suppliers,IV each responsible for about
15% of its production. Other brands follow similar sourcing
strategies. 
The world’s largest branded sports shoe manufacturer,
Hong Kong-based Yue Yuen, produced 17% of the world’s
sports shoes in 2006. You may not have heard of Yue Yuen,
but if you’re wearing sports shoes made by adidas, ASICS,
New Balance, or Puma, amongst others, chances are Yue
Yuen may have manufactured them. We will talk more
about Yue Yuen in Chapter IV. 
Sports apparel: The sports apparel sector is less consoli-
dated. However, large transnational suppliers have made
their presence felt in that sector as well. The first and sec-
ond largest cap manufacturers in the world, for example,
are the Korean transnationals Dada Corporations and
Yupoong Inc. 
Dada Corporations produces one out of every four (sports)
caps in the world in factories located in Bangladesh, China,
Vietnam and Indonesia. Most of its exports go to the USA,
to be sold under a number of different brand names.39
Yupoong Inc., the second largest cap manufacturer, is a
Korean transnational that has offices and factories in
Korea, Vietnam, Bangladesh, the USA, the UK, and until
recently, the Dominican Republic.40
You may not have heard of either of these firms, but if
you’re wearing a sports cap from Nike, adidas, Timberland
or ReebokV, it was likely made by one of these companies.
Sourcing agents
A more prevalent model in apparel production is the use of
sourcing agents that do not own any production facilities,
but orchestrate production for brand buyers and retailers
through a network of suppliers and subcontractors situat-
ed in countries around the world. They function as a one-
stop shop (or supply chain manager and logistics handler)
for the brand or retailer. This business model allows the
sourcing agent – and in turn, their clients – maximum flex-
ibility and a quick response to changing markets. It also
relies on the existence of a flexible, precarious and dispos-
able labour force.
Li & Fung is the world’s largest supply chain management
company, sourcing US$7.1 billion worth of goods in 2005.41
Headquartered in Hong Kong, Li & Fung co-ordinates the
manufacture of goods through a network of offices in close
IV.  In addition to Yue Yuen, Nike main suppliers include Tae Kwang, Chang Shin, Pan-Asia Group, and Feng Tay
V. Adidas bought Reebok, but continues to manufacture the Reebok brand.
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to 40 countries. Most of the manufacturing takes place in
Asia, but in recent years Li & Fung has also established
operations in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and
Central America – sites that are closer to customers both in
Europe and the USA. 
You may not have heard of Li & Fung, but chances are if you
wear sportswear bearing the Fila or Kappa brand, Li & Fung
was the company that organized its manufacture.  
What does all this mean for worker rights?
Traditionally, responsibility for respecting worker rights
rested squarely with the primary employer, who had to
deal with workers, unions and local governments concern-
ing the company’s responsibilities under local labour law
and collective bargaining agreements. 
However, in the globalized supply chains that characterize
the sportswear industry, responsibility for ensuring that
worker rights are respected doesn’t end at the factory gates. 
Buyer responsibility
After coming under fire from consumers and labour rights
advocates in the 1990s, brands and retailers that do not
directly manufacture their branded goods have for the
most part accepted that they share responsibility for ensur-
ing that the conditions under which those products are
made comply with accepted international labour standards
and local laws. 
That responsibility results, in part, from the control brands
and retailers exert over the terms and conditions under
which their goods are produced. For example, buyers have
exerted significant control over:
• Design and materials;
• Volumes, timing and frequency of orders;
• Production and delivery deadlines;
• Stability of orders; 
• Prices paid to suppliers; and
• Quality.
All of these factors can influence working conditions at the
factory level. When order volumes are too high and dead-
lines too short, factories often compensate by increasing
overtime, setting unreasonable production targets for
workers and/or subcontracting work to other facilities.
When orders are unstable, factories sometimes compen-
sate by hiring workers on successive temporary contracts.
When prices are too low, workers are unable to achieve
wage gains. 
If we are to reapportion the risks and costs of sportswear
production appropriately, brands and retailers at the top of
the supply chain must accept a substantial share of
responsibility for the conditions under which their products
are made.
“Supplier ownership”
Suppliers, however, are not off the hook. Smaller suppliers
have relatively little bargaining power with their brand cus-
tomers. They tend to compete on price, rarely have the abil-
ity to pass on costs for labour rights compliance back to the
buyers, and therefore experience constraints on their abil-
ity to increase wages or other monetary benefits. 
However, many suppliers – especially in the athletic
footwear sector – are multinational corporations in their
own right. They must take greater ownership of labour
standards compliance programs and make a serious effort
to improve wages and other forms of compensation. 
The emergence of large, consolidated transnational suppli-
ers means that some sportswear manufacturers may have
increased bargaining power with buyers and can arguably
share as much responsibility for ensuring that worker rights
are respected at their facilities. 
As part of the process of industry consolidation, these
transnational suppliers may achieve more stable, long-
term relationships with major brands. As a result, they may
also be able to pass some of their increased costs back to
the buyers and demand more reasonable production
deadlines. For example, some analysts suggest that
footwear giant Yue Yuen, given its size and position in the
supply chain, has been able to pass on some of its
increased materials costs on to buyers.42
On the plus side, industry consolidation could open up the
possibility that a transnational supplier, particularly one
that produces footwear, could make significant improve-
ments in wages and working conditions, even where there
are financial implications. 
Brand buyers argue that when they develop longer term
business relationships with a small number of large suppli-
ers, their ability to work with those suppliers to ensure
compliance with international labour standards and local
laws increases.  
However, there is no guarantee that when brands and
retailers consolidate production with a few transnational
suppliers, there will be greater stability for their wholly
owned or subcontract facilities or improved conditions for
workers. Unless and until buyers, sourcing agents and sup-
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pliers are willing to collectively alter the terms under which
they do business, there will continue to be constraints on
what can be achieved at the factory level. 
After consolidation, wages and working conditions will still
depend on the ability and willingness of the supplier and
factory management to negotiate decent wages and work-
ing conditions, the ability of workers to bargain collective-
ly, and the ability and willingness of local governments to
improve and enforce labour laws and regulations – all of
which have been undermined by the current business
model. 
Unfortunately, Play Fair research has found instances
where transnational suppliers and sourcing agents have
made decisions that have negatively impacted on workers’
rights, independent of the actions of the brand buyers. For
example, in the wake of the phase-out of import quotas
under the MFA, transnational suppliers have closed facto-
ries in certain countries despite the apparent willingness of
brand buyers to continue sourcing goods from those facto-
ries. In other instances, suppliers have resisted the estab-
lishment of unions in their factories despite buyers,
expressed willingness to source from a unionized factory,
or have shifted orders from unionized factories to their
other non-union factories. 
We will look at some of these cases in Chapter III.  
The sportswear industry’s dominant business model has
created a complex web of actors and middlemen with vary-
ing degrees of control and/or influence. Industry consoli-
dation could create some new opportunities to address
persistent labour rights abuses. However, there will not be
significant improvements in wages and working conditions
in this industry unless and until buyers, suppliers, sourcing
agents, and factory management engage with trade
unions, governments and NGOs in a comprehensive, col-
laborative, sector-wide effort to tackle the systemic prob-
lems in the industry that have hindered progress by indi-
vidual actors. 
We’ll look at examples of what has been and could be done
in Chapters VI and VII. 
17
Launched in 2003, the Play Fair at the Olympics Campaign
was the biggest international worker rights mobilization of
its kind ever undertaken, with active participation of trade
unions and labour rights organizations from all around the
world. Hundreds of organizations and many top athletes
participated in over 500 local events in 35 countries. More
than half a million signatures were collected in support of
the campaign.
The Campaign made it abundantly clear to the sportswear
industry that consumers and workers share the same con-
cerns about the abuse and exploitation that lie behind the
public face of many sportswear brands.
But the objective of the Campaign wasn’t to embarrass com-
panies with stories of worker rights abuses. The Play Fair
Alliance attempted to engage with major sportswear compa-
nies and industry associations in a serious effort to find real
solutions to the problems sportswear workers face on a daily
basis. Unfortunately, progress to date has been slow. 
Industry’s Response to the Programme of Work
In 2004, the Campaign developed a Programme of Work
for the industry designed to substantially increase activi-
ties that promote freedom of association and collective
bargaining, and to build industry-wide action and cooper-
ation with relevant stakeholders to ensure labour stan-
dards compliance throughout the industry. The
Programme asked companies, both individually and col-
lectively, to improve and align their codes and compliance
programs with best practice in the sector, and to take pos-
itive measures including:
• Facilitating training with workers and management on
freedom of association; 
• Building complaints and dispute resolution mechanisms
and effective management systems; 
• Developing clear guidance for suppliers on freedom of
association and collective bargaining;
• Working with credible (local) organizations that have the
confidence of workers and their trade unions to conduct, or
assist in conducting, social audits or workplace inspections;
• Signing a framework agreementVI between the
International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers
Federation (ITGLWF) and the World Federation of
Sporting Goods Industries (WFSGI) and its member com-
panies to facilitate freedom of association and collective
bargaining; 
• Developing more stable business relationships with sup-
pliers, providing sufficient lead times so that production
can be carried out using humane working hours, and
offering suppliers prices that fully reflect the costs of
observing labour standards; and
• Involving the ILO in an investigation of purchasing prac-
tices and in a more proactive role on code implementa-
tion and verification.
In May 2004, six sportswear companies (Puma, ASICS,
Umbro, Mizuno, Nike and adidas), together with the WFSGI,
the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and the International
Olympic Committee met with the Play Fair Alliance in
Geneva at a meeting convened by the International Labour
Organization (ILO). Fila, Lotto and Kappa, the other target-
ed companies, did not participate.
The response of the WFSGI – the primary international
industry association representing thousands of sportswear
companies – was particularly disappointing, especially in
light of the glaring need for a coordinated, industry-wide
effort that exerts sufficient control over production to
implement substantial changes in the industry. 
The WFSGI deferred to the FLA to take the lead on the issues
raised by the Alliance, even though only four WFSGI members
are part of the FLA.VII In a subsequent exchange of letters, the
WFSGI indicated that it was not willing to enter into a frame-
VI. An International Framework Agreement is defined by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) as “an agreement negotiated between a
multinational company and a global union federation concerning the international activities of that company. The main purpose of a framework
agreement is to establish a formal ongoing relationship between the multinational company and the global union federation which can solve pro-
blems and work in the interests of both parties.”
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work agreement with the ITGLWF or to take a lead role in rep-
resenting the industry on these initiatives.
The FLA, for its part, was more forthcoming. The FLA has
prepared detailed guidance documents for its members on
freedom of association, including Compliance Benchmarks
that outline key issues member companies must evaluate
to determine supplier compliance with this fundamental
worker right. The FLA has also conducted labour rights
training for factory management in a number of countries.
However, the FLA’s credibility in some quarters is limited by
shortcomings in its code of conduct, monitoring practices
and governance model. 
WHAT IS THE FAIR LABOR
ASSOCIATION?
The Fair Labor Association (FLA) is a multi-
stakeholder initiative of companies, universi-
ties and NGOs. As of February 2008, there
were 24 brand-name companies participating
in the FLA, including adidas, ASICS, Nike,
Puma, Patagonia and others, representing a
majority of the major brands in the athletic
footwear industry and a significant percentage
of the athletic apparel market. The FLA has
also admitted five Participating Suppliers,
including Forward Sports Ltd, which makes
soccer balls in Pakistan. These companies
have committed to a program of labour stan-
dards implementation, monitoring and reme-
diation in order to bring their manufacturing
sites into compliance with FLA standards.
The FLA’s code of conduct has been criticized
by labour and human rights groups for failing
to include provisions for a living wage, ade-
quate protections on hours of work, and insuf-
ficient protections for freedom of association
and collective bargaining in countries where
those rights are legally denied. The FLA began
a review of its code in February 2008.
For more information on the FLA, visit:
www.fairlabor.org. 
Responses from individual companies varied. Play Fair rep-
resentatives met with four of the companies targeted in the
initial campaign (Puma, ASICS, Mizuno and Umbro), and
each agreed to undertake some of the actions called for in
the Programme of Work.VIII 
To varying degrees each of these companies committed to
do the following: 
• Address freedom of association issues via worker train-
ing, to be organized in cooperation with Play Fair organi-
zations (Umbro & Puma);
• Pay greater attention to the impact of purchasing practices
and share relevant information with the campaign (Puma); 
• Evaluate and further develop their labour practice poli-
cies, including supply chain mapping and wage criteria
(ASICS and Mizuno); 
• Consider working with other active companies and non-
governmental organizations via the FLA. Following the
campaign, Umbro and ASICS joined the FLA.
Kappa, Lotto and Fila, which were highlighted in the 2004
campaign, were less forthcoming. Kappa, which is involved
in a joint venture with Li & Fung, did meet with ITGWLF
Italian affiliates to discuss the possibility of a global frame-
work agreement in 2005, but there has been no progress
to date. Lotto, while recognizing the importance of a sec-
tor-wide approach and entering into dialogue with trade
unions on a national level, has done little to pro-actively
address labour rights issues throughout its supply chain.
Fila has failed to respond in any meaningful way to the
Programme.
FLA member companies (including Nike, Reebok, adidas
and Puma) jointly responded to the Programme of Work,
confirming the central importance of promoting freedom of
association and the need for additional guidance for mon-
itors on this issue. They also acknowledged the need to
develop remedial strategies that provide workers with the
awareness and an environment conducive to forming or
VII. At the time, the four WFSGI member companies that also belonged to the FLA represented 63 percent of the athletic footwear market and 15.8
percent of the athletic apparel market.
VIII. For an evaluation of company responses shortly after the 2004 campaign, see: Merk, Jeroen. 2005. The Play Fair at the Olympics Campaign: An
Evaluation of Company Responses. Clean Clothes Campaign, Oxfam, Global Unions. Available at:
http://www.fairolympics.org/background/pfoc_evaluation.pdf
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Companies have also tended to pick the “low hanging fruit”
– the most egregious and publicly damaging abuses such
as child labour or the most visible, easiest to measure and
fix violations, such as blocked fire exits – or have concen-
trated on issues that have little or no monetary or structur-
al implications for the brand buyers at the top of the sup-
ply chain. 
Companies (and many CSR consultants) have continued to
focus their efforts on developing a “business case” for
labour standards compliance, emphasizing the potential
cost savings inherent in good human resources manage-
ment.45 This approach, however, runs the risk of sidelining
necessary improvements on workers’ wages and other
monetary issues that could impact on profits or prices.  
While there has been strong brand buyer acknowledge-
ment of freedom of association as a core labour right –
something we will discuss more fully in the next chapter –
there has also been a tendency to consolidate production
in a number of jurisdictions where this right is legally
restricted, prohibited or threatened.46 This consolidation,
along with other factors, has resulted in closures and mass
dismissals, including at factories where improvements had
been painstakingly achieved, undermining progress made. 
Lastly, many of the “sustainable” solutions proposed by
companies and the FLA have focused on training for facto-
ry management on labour rights and human resources
processes, rather than on creating a positive climate for
trade unions and worker organizing or altering sourcing
practices and business models at the buyer level. 
Management training on labour rights can produce some
positive results; however, management is only part of the
puzzle. Sustainable solutions also require that workers are
aware of their rights and that they and their representa-
tives are actively involved in any efforts to improve labour
practices and working conditions.
joining organizations of their own choice. FLA companies
also pledged to develop more effective complaints mecha-
nisms and new forms of dialogue and cooperation with
local stakeholders.
Unfortunately, there was very little response to the Play Fair
demand that companies address the impact of purchasing
practices on labour rights in their supply chains. 
In 2006, Oxfam International issued its Offside! report,
which evaluated company progress on the Programme of
Work, particularly on the issue of freedom of association
and collective bargaining. While Oxfam found that some
companies had made efforts in particular factories,
progress has been limited. Further, the report concluded
that there is “little progress to report in terms of sports
brand owners addressing the impact of their buying prac-
tices – price, delivery time and stability of business rela-
tionship – on workers’ rights.”43
So why are worker rights abuses still an issue?
Since 2004, corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives
have grown exponentially. In recent years, leading sports-
wear brands have acknowledged that previous auditing
and compliance initiatives have failed to build sustainable
labour standards compliance in sportswear factories and
have begun to try to identify and address root causes of
labour rights abuses.44 These are positive steps.
Nonetheless, labour rights advocates should take note of
the kinds of the concerns being given the most attention by
sportswear companies and multi-stakeholder initiatives
(MSIs), and which are not. For example, while some
process-based purchasing practices like short lead times
and excessive design changes are now cited in recent cor-
porate social responsibility reports, a frank discussion of
how low prices paid by buyers to suppliers impact on
wages is harder to find. 
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Kuan Ho Sporting Goods (Dongguan) Company  in China: 
A worker taking water from a hawker after buying food from the hawker
in lunchtime. (November 2007)
Kuan Ho Sporting Goods (Dongguan)
Company  in China: 
Recruitment notice and simple 
factory introduction. The notice
includes the major clients of the 
factory and also states that the 
average wage is around 1,200 yuan.
(November 2007)
Need for Collaboration
One positive development since the initial Play Fair at the
Olympics Campaign was launched is the increased number
of instances of collaboration between companies, trade
unions, governments and NGOs on labour rights issues,
which is essential for significant advances to be made.
Although the sportswear industry, as we have seen, is
highly competitive, there is ample room for collaboration
on common ground rules and approaches to ensuring that
a company’s competitive edge is not built on the flexible
labour and abject poverty of its workers. 
Some companies – notably adidas, Puma and Nike – have
publicly disclosed their factory lists, opening the door to
collaboration with other buyers at common factories on
auditing and remediation. More importantly, disclosure of
factory locations represents an invitation to trade unions
and labour rights NGOs to bring workplace problems to the
attention of brands and to collaborate with them on reme-
diation. In fact, in a series of national meetings in the
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, the above
brands and a number of their key in-country suppliers
engaged with ITGLWF affiliates in a dialogue on the imple-
mentation of freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining within their local supply chain.
While a larger number of companies have begun to share
audit findings among themselves through databases, such
as the Fair Factories Clearinghouse,47 that information is
not shared with other key stakeholders, such as trade
unions and labour rights NGOs.  
The FLA and its member companies have collaborated on
training programs and capacity building in regions or fac-
tories where they source production. There have also been
notable efforts at individual factories where brand buyers,
local unions and Global Unions like the ITGLWF have col-
laborated to address specific problems.
We believe that increased collaboration across the sports-
wear industry – involving buyers, suppliers, sourcing
agents, multi-stakeholder initiatives, workers and their rep-
resentatives, governments and NGOs – is essential to tack-
le the more persistent labour rights abuses and poverty
wages that still plague the industry. Until it tackles the root
causes of those problems, the industry will continue to be
plagued with labour rights violations. 
Sportswear companies, the industry as a whole, as well as
the multi-stakeholder organizations in which companies
participate, need to make firm commitments to proactively
dealing with the programs endemic to the industry.  
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Kuan Ho Sporting Goods (Dongguan) Company  in China: 
Workers taking rest outside the factory building after having lunch.
(November 2007)
Kuan Ho Sporting Goods (Dongguan) Company  in China: 
Factory main entrance and recruitment banner. (November 2007) 
Kuan Ho Sporting Goods (Dongguan) Company  in China: 
Factory main entrance. (November 2007)
Kuan Ho Sporting Goods (Dongguan) Company  in China: 
Workers taking rest outside the factory building after having lunch.
(November 2007)
Building on the experience and accomplishments of the
2004 Play Fair at the Olympics Campaign, in 2007, some
members of the Play Fair Alliance launched the Play Fair
2008 campaign. 
Based on the responses of the sportswear industry and
Olympic movement to the Programme of Work,IX Play Fair
2008 put forward a comprehensive set of demands
addressed to the International Olympic Committee,
National Olympic Committees, sportswear brands and sup-
pliers, governments, and investors. 
Play Fair 2008’s Campaign Statement and full
set of demands are available at:
www.playfair2008.org/templates/templatepla
yfair/docs/PF_2008_campaign_statement.pdf 
If each of the important players in the global sportswear
industry – buyers, suppliers, sourcing agents, multi-stake-
holder initiatives – took concrete steps to meet these
demands, we would be well on our way to improving work-
ing conditions throughout the sector. 
To move the process forward, we have identified three cen-
tral problems that, if left unaddressed, will inhibit the
industry’s ability to make real progress on other issues.
These include: 
• Lack of respect for freedom of association and the right
to bargain collectively; 
• Insecurity of employment caused by industry restructur-
ing; and 
• Abuse of short-term labour contracting and other forms
of precarious employment.
The lack of respect for workers’ right to freedom of associ-
ation and to bargain collectively, for example, impedes
worker efforts to resolve workplace problems as they arise
and to negotiate long-term improvements in wages and
working conditions.  
Similarly, the rash of factory closures that has accompa-
nied industry restructuring over the past few years con-
tributes to a climate of fear amongst workers and suppli-
ers, feeding the myth that any efforts to improve conditions
will only lead to more job losses. When workers face
employment insecurity, they are less likely to take steps to
challenge abusive practices. 
The growing use of short-term contracting and other forms of
precarious employment is denying workers their social secu-
rity and other legal entitlements, discouraging worker organ-
izing, and undermining the enforcement of labour regulations,
which too often do not apply to non-permanent workers. 
If the sportswear industry is serious about changing the
way business is currently done, there is an urgent need to
take immediate steps to address these three central issues. 
In this chapter and throughout the report, we take a closer
look at these issues – limits to freedom of association and
collective bargaining, factory closures, and precarious
employment. 
A fourth and perhaps the most difficult hurdle to overcome
concerns wages.
Sportswear brands tend to focus on issues that can be
addressed without significantly altering profits or the cost
of its products. So-called “cash standards,” such as a living
wage provision, may alter total labour costs and therefore
affect profits and prices. 
While industry leaders have been willing to take action in
some cases to ensure that workers receive the legal mini-
mum wage or prevailing industry wage, they have general-
ly been unwilling to take steps to ensure that workers’
wages are sufficient to meet basic needs. 
IX. To see company responses, visit http://www.fairolympics.org/background.html.
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Payment of a living wage is not just a question of more
money in workers’ pockets, it’s also a part of improving
general working conditions – for instance in reducing
excessive working hours that workers sometimes accept
because they can’t make ends meet without working
extraordinary and often illegal amounts of overtime. 
For these reasons, our report both examines the issue of
the living wage and puts forward concrete suggestions on
how the industry can work to meet this standard.
Freedom of Association and Collective
Bargaining
THE HURDLE
Although recognized in most major sportswear
brand codes of conduct, these rights are continual-
ly threatened. Workers who organize face discrimi-
nation, dismissal, and even violence. Factories
where workers have organized trade unions have
been closed, and orders have been shifted to non-
union factories. Sourcing from China, Vietnam and
other jurisdictions where freedom of association is
restricted by law has increased. 
Freedom of association is a fundamental right, but it is also
described as an “enabling right,” which means that where
it is respected, it enables workers and their representatives
to address and resolve immediate workplace issues with
management, and to negotiate longer term improvements
in wages and working conditions. It also opens up the pos-
sibility of achieving sustainable compliance with other crit-
ical labour standards.
In response to complaints from workers, trade unions and
campaign groups, some sportswear buyers have taken
steps in particular cases to put a stop to reprisals against
workers for exercising their associational rights and to
push suppliers to accept and negotiate with unions once
they are established. Most major sportswear brands have
publicly expressed support for freedom of association in
their codes of conduct, and some leading brands, includ-
ing Nike and adidas, have pledged to do more to ensure
that this right is respected in their supply chains.48
However, the dominant attitude and practice in the sports-
wear industry, as well as the garment and footwear indus-
tries as a whole, is so biased against the development of
trade unions that a more proactive approach is needed to
create a positive (rather than just neutral) climate for
unions to exist and play their proper role. We believe that,
as was set out in a recent collaborative project involving six
of the major multi-stakeholder initiatives,X companies
should “adopt a positive approach towards the activities of
trade unions and an open attitude towards the organiza-
tional activities of workers.”
What obstacles do workers face when they
attempt to organize?
Dismissal of union leaders and supporters: When work-
ers first attempt to organize unions, they often encounter
substantial resistance from factory management. 
• On November 8, 2007, workers making National Football
League T-shirts at the Star factory in Honduras formally
registered their new union. By November 12, 55 of the 58
founding members of the union had been fired.49
[What was done to fix this? See page 47]
• At Russell Athletic’s Jerzees Choloma factory in Honduras,
workers established a union in March 2007. By June 14,
about 90% of the 72 founding members had been dis-
missed. And, when 56 more workers tried to re-establish
the union in September 2007, 22 more workers were
fired.50 [What was done to fix this? See page 47]
• At the Mikasa Industries soccer ball factory in Thailand, a
nascent trade union was crushed in 2006 and 2007
when most of the union leaders and members were dis-
missed or pressured to resign from the union. Waraporn
Rakthai, the union’s president, was reassigned to work
alone in a restricted area for two years.51 [What has hap-
pened since? See page 47]    
• In December 2006, just one week after beginning a recruit-
ment drive for their legally-registered union, six union lead-
ers at the Thai Garment Export factory in Thailand (which
produces for Nike and Cutter & Buck) were summarily dis-
missed. [What was done to fix this? See page 47]
• Just days after forming a union at the MSP Sportswear
factory in Thailand in October 2004, factory management
fired three union leaders, including the president and
general secretary. MSP produces for Nike, amongst oth-
ers. [What was done to fix this? See page 47]
Refusal to recognize and negotiate with unions: Even
when workers succeed in forming unions and having them
legally registered, management often delays or refuses to
accept legal recognition and/or to negotiate with elected
worker representatives. 
X. The Joint Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Worker Rights (Jo-In) involved six multi-stakeholder initiatives in developing a common
approach to monitoring worker rights in Turkey. The Jo-In code of conduct is available at: http://www.jo-in.org/pub/docs/Jo-
In%20Draft%20Common%20Code%205.05.pdf 
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• In 2005, the Textile, Knitting and Clothing Industry
Workers’ Union of Turkey (TEKSIF) successfully organized
workers at the PAXAR Corporation’s factory, which pro-
duced labels, print logos and designs on garments for
brands including Nike, adidas and Puma. However, when
the union approached PAXAR management to begin col-
lective bargaining, PAXAR refused to negotiate and
instead fired 11 union members. It wasn’t until interna-
tional pressure from several multi-stakeholder initiatives,
the ITGLWF, and campaign groups like the Clean Clothes
Campaign that the company agreed to sit down and
negotiate with the union, which resulted in a much-
delayed agreement being achieved in February 2007 –
two years after the union’s formation. In the meantime,
many union member had been dismissed, some as a
result of anti-union discrimination by the employer.52
Closures and reduction in orders to unionized facilities:
Although discrimination against unionized factories is clearly
a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of buyer and MSI
codes of conduct,XI it’s often hard to prove that closures or
reductions in orders to particular factories are linked to the
presence of a union. However, the pattern of closures and
order reductions following successful union organizing drives
is too common to be dismissed as coincidental. 
• When the Perbupas union won a wage increase at an
Indonesian factory in January 2004, following a two–
month strike, the factory responded by shifting all Nike
orders to another facility, and refusing to relocate mem-
bers of the Perbupas union to that facility. The original
facility was closed in June 2006, and later re-opened –
although none of the Perbupas members were given
positions at the re-opened factory.53
Buyers sometimes cut back on orders at factories where
unions have been established, or shift orders out of the
factory altogether. 
• At the PT Panarub facility in Indonesia, where the
Perbupas union is also present, 33 union members were
fired after participating in a strike in October 2005.
Although adidas did press management to reinstate the
workers, the company also cut back on orders to the fac-
tory in mid-2006 while efforts to win reinstatement were
still underway, citing quality and delivery time concerns.
While it’s unlikely that the reduction in orders was a
response to the union’s efforts, it did lessen adidas’ abil-
ity to push for compliance in this instance. The US-based
Worker Rights Consortium asked adidas to offer to
resume full orders as an incentive for reinstating the
workers, but adidas declined to do so.54
In the absence of a clear buyer commitment to favour
unionized suppliers, the mere threat of buyers shifting
orders can be used by factory managers to dissuade work-
ers from organizing unions.
Shifting production to jurisdictions where freedom of
association is restricted: In 2006, Oxfam International
raised concerns in their “Offside!” report55 about the
increasing shift of production to countries or export pro-
cessing zones where workers’ right to freedom of associa-
tion and collective bargaining are restricted by law. 
In China, for example, a union can only operate legally if it
is affiliated with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU), which is controlled by the state. Strikes are neither
specifically legal nor illegal but are vigorously and some-
times violently repressed and have been regarded as a
threat to social order since 1982. In factories where unions
are present, workers are frequently represented by unelect-
ed union officials – often themselves members of factory
management – who are regularly criticized for doing little
to improve working conditions or protect workers’ rights. 
Sometimes suppliers respond to successful union organiz-
ing efforts by relocating production from a newly unionized
factory in one country to another factory in a jurisdiction
where freedom of association is prohibited. 
• In 2003, PT Daejoo Leports, an Indonesian supplier of
sportswear to adidas and VF Corporation, agreed to
negotiate with the SPN union at the urging of the buyers.
This was significant progress – previously the union had
faced threats and rejection when it attempted to bargain
with the company. But by the summer of 2004, the com-
pany closed its doors and moved production to China –
even though the buyers expressed their preference to
continue production in Indonesia.56
Buyers also choose to source goods from countries where
their own codes of conduct cannot be fully implemented
because of legal restrictions on freedom of association –
as evidenced by the massive amount of orders placed in
China, Vietnam and Bangladeshi export processing zones. 
Promotion of “worker committees” as a substitute for
unions: When sportswear brands do source production
from countries like China or Vietnam, where freedom of
association and collective bargaining are legally restricted,
brands sometimes promote “parallel means” of worker
representation that solicit worker input and allow limited
forms of elected worker representation. In order to avoid
negative impacts on workers’ associational rights, howev-
er, the use of worker committees as “parallel means” to
free association and collective bargaining should be
encouraged only in countries or areas where trade union
rights are legally restricted – not where genuine freedom of
XI. Some buyers like Reebok, Puma, and adidas have explicitly stated that closing factories to eliminate a union is a violation of their code of conduct
(see Connor, Tim and Kelly Dent. Offside! Labour rights and sportswear production in Asia. Oxfam International, 2006)
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association and collective bargaining are available to
workers. 
In some countries, the law may provide for elected works
councils or labour/management councils or committees.
Provided that workers are also free to join trade unions and
to engage in collective bargaining, and that ILO Convention
135 and Recommendation 143 (on Worker
Representatives) are adhered to, these councils or commit-
tees can be consistent with freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining.XII
There are positive and negative examples of the use of
worker committees to increase workers’ voice in factories
in jurisdictions where genuine worker organizations are
restricted. At best these committees can provide a conduit
for worker complaints and suggestions, and play an active
role in worker training on health and safety and other
issues. At worst, they can become management-controlled
entities that disempower workers. Some of the problems
encountered with worker committees include:
Management runs the committees or selects the members,
and workers are not represented
At some Yue Yuen factories in China, management has set
up so-called workers’ livelihood centres where workers can
complain about workplace, canteen, and dormitory prob-
lems. However, workers told Play Fair researchers that
these centres are run by management and workers don’t
feel represented by them.57
At a soccerball factory in Dongguan, China producing for Nike,
Puma, Wilson, Fila, Lotto, adidas and others, workers told Play
Fair researchers that there is a worker committee in the facto-
ry but all its members are appointed by management.
Workers said the committee is only a formality to appease
auditors but irrelevant to the welfare of workers.XIII
An Indian factory cutting and stitching sports shoes for adidas
established a workers’ committee to deal with health and
safety issues, but management hand-picked the workers who
would sit on the committee. Auditors reported that workers
were not aware of the existence of the committee.58
Communication is one-way only
At a factory in India producing for Reebok and Nike, the
Workers’ Forum established by management to address
worker grievances initially consisted of workers appointed by
management. When Reebok intervened in 2003, manage-
ment agreed to hold elections for worker representatives on
the Forum and a Grievance Committee. By August, 2007,
however, adidas (who had acquired Reebok) noted that the
committees still “tend[ed] to be one of management’s com-
munication channels to the workers rather than active com-
mittees for representing workers to the management.”59
Workers are too intimidated to raise real issues
At an adidas supplier in Thailand, all members of the
Workers’ Welfare Committee are line supervisors. Workers
reported that they do not understand the roles and duties
of the Welfare Committee. Workers felt too intimidated to
make suggestions or raise complaints with the Committee,
as one worker was terminated when he asked a simple
question, ‘When will we get a raise?’60 
Precarious Employment
THE HURDLE
The use of short-term contract or casual labour
has become widespread in the industry.
Workers on short-term contracts are often inel-
igible for basic protections and benefits, and
in most instances cannot form unions. Short-
term or casual workers who try to improve con-
ditions can be easily – and legally – dismissed
at the end of their contract, making them espe-
cially vulnerable. 
The sportswear industry is addicted to flexibility. In the cur-
rent sportswear business model, retailers, brands, and
transnational suppliers seek to maximize their ability to
change not only the styles and products being produced,
but the factories and/or countries in which the goods are
being made, all in pursuit of the quickest, most reliable,
best quality and, of course, cheapest production. 
Factory owners and managers, in turn, have adopted simi-
lar business goals, seeking maximum flexibility in order to
best compete for sportswear contracts. Because equip-
ment and facility costs are relatively inflexible, the need for
flexibility has been placed on workers shoulders in part
through precarious employment relationships.   
Short-term employment contracts: Although compre-
hensive global data across the industry is not available, in
recent years, unions and labour rights organizations have
reported an increasing use of successive short-term
employment contracts – or in many cases, no written con-
tracts whatsoever. The use of short-term contracts has
been used to deny workers statutory benefits and bonus-
es, and to undermine worker organization:
XII. Further reading: http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/docs/CCC_FoA_Primer.pdf
XIII. Play Fair researchers interviewed 15 workers from the factory between October and December 2007.
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• At one Yue Yuen-owned facility and one Yue Yuen joint
venture factory in Dongguan, China, producing for adidas
and Nike, workers interviewed for this report had no
employment contracts whatsoever.61 At three wholly-
owned Yue Yuen factories and two Yue Yuen subcontract
factories, workers were hired on successive one-year con-
tracts.62
• At PT Busana Prima GlobalXIV facilities in Indonesia, new
employees are hired only on a short-term contract basis.
Contract workers don’t have the same rights as perma-
nent workers, such as annual leave and menstrual leave.
At BPG I, workers estimate that 40% of workers are now
on short-term contracts. At BPG III, which opened in
2001, workers reported that only one worker out of 1,097
is on permanent status.63
• From 2003 to early 2006, the percentage of the work-
force on short-term contracts at PCCS Garment in
Cambodia grew to 25%. PPCS produced goods for adi-
das, Gap and Puma. Contracts usually lasted two or three
months, with some workers being on successive con-
tracts for more than two years. When their contract
expired, workers were rehired under new short-term con-
tracts, losing seniority and any benefits, such as materni-
ty leave, annual leave, or wage increases that would
accrue with seniority at the factory.64
• The ILO has reported a general increase in the use of
short-term contracts for workers in Cambodian garment
factories, expressing concern that employers may be
using short-term contracts “to undermine workers’
employment security.”65 In their most recent report, the
ILO’s Better Factories Cambodia program noted that non-
compliance on this issue has increased by 3% between
April and October 2007 amongst factories monitored.66
Findings of non-compliance had already increased by 5%
in the six months between November 2006 and April
2007.67
Contracting Agencies: Where the excessive use of short-
term contracts has been legally restricted, some employers
have responded by hiring workers through a third-party
contracting agency that acts as the legal employer of the
worker (known as “dispatched labour”), – even though the
workers are still, for all intents and purposes, performing
regular duties at the factory.
• In November 2007, Chinese media reported that sports
cap manufacturer Global Cap Products Ltd.XV in the
Guangzhou Economic and Technological Development
Zone was pressuring its employees to sign new employ-
ment contracts with a third-party agency. Workers who
accepted the new arrangement before December 31,
2007, (the day before a new Chinese contract labour law
took effect) were promised a raise in wages. Workers who
refused were told their contracts would not be renewed.
Those who signed the new contracts with the third-party
agency could be re-posted to workplaces anywhere in
Guangzhou province if work at Global Cap Products
slowed down.68
• At the Molten Thailand factory (which produced the
World Cup 2006 TeamGeist soccerball for adidas  as well
as their own brand), workers told the Thai Labour
Campaign that the factory was increasingly hiring work-
ers through a third-party agency. Dispatched workers
receive lower wages and benefits and have to purchase
their own uniforms.69
The use of dispatched labour creates additional insecurity
for workers who have few protections under the arrange-
ment. While there are some kinds of labour that might be
subcontracted through third parties because they are not
part of the core work of the factory (such as canteen service),
the workers engaged in the core services of the factory
should be employed directly and on permanent contracts. 
What’s driving the increase in precarious employ-
ment?
In order to reduce standing inventories, the industry works
on a just-in-time model that delivers goods when they are
needed on store shelves. This increases the seasonality of
production, so that there are high and low seasons for fac-
tory orders, with greater seasonal fluctuations in sports
apparel than with sports shoes production (see figures 1
and 2 below). 
As long as the global system of sportswear production
remains unstable, there will be a drive to download the
bulk of the risk involved in competing for business and
orders. Those that can no longer download the risk – the
workers at the bottom of the supply chain – end up bear-
ing the brunt of the instability in the system. 
XIV. BPG produces for sportswear brands like Fila, Prostar, Converse, Elverys Sports, Erima, Surridge, Le Coq Sportif, Sergio Tacchini and others.
XV. There is no formal English name listed for the company. The company’s name could also be translated as “Universal Hat Company Ltd.”
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FIGURES 1 AND 2: TWO EXAMPLES OF THE SEASONALITY
OF IMPORTS TO THE USA, 2004-2007.
Seasonality of sports footwear imports into the US from China,
Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, 2004-2007
During the high season, a factory needs increased capaci-
ty and a larger workforce to meet order deadlines. During
the low season, there may not be enough work to sustain
a large workforce. Factories cope with “seasonality” in a
number of ways:
• Demanding excessive overtime of regular workers during
the high season;
• Subcontracting excess production to other factories dur-
ing the high season;
• Employing short-term contract labour that can be let go
during the low season; and
• Using dispatched labour that can be dismissed during
the low season.
Additionally, the use of short-term contracts, subcontract-
ing and dispatched labour can be simply an employer’s
attempt to reduce its costs and obligations to workers
and/or eliminate trade unions in order to maximize profits
or increase competitiveness irresponsibly. 
There are legal restrictions in some countries against the
over-use of short-term contracts and dispatched labour. 
•  Cambodian labour law stipulates that short-term con-
tracts cannot be for a period of longer than two years,
and while the contract can be renewed one or more
times, after two years on one or more successive fixed-
term contracts, workers are deemed to be on permanent
contracts.70
•  In Korea, an amendment to employment laws, which
came into effect on July 1, 2007, stipulates that workers
cannot be employed on fixed-term contacts for more
than two years. After the second year, a worker is consid-
ered to be on a permanent contract. Similarly, dis-
patched labour cannot be employed for longer than two
years, after which the company must hire the worker
directly or face a fine of up to US$30,000.71
•  In China, a new labour contract law came into effect in
January of this year. The law builds on existing legislation
requiring companies to sign an employment contract
with all workers. It also requires companies to grant
open-ended contracts to workers after no more than two
short-term contracts, and provide severance pay to
workers commensurate with the length of their employ-
ment.72 Workers who were already employed by one
employer for longer than ten years are to be automatical-
ly granted permanent contracts. Workers hired through
third-party agencies must be given contracts with a min-
imum of two years duration. 
Unfortunately, some international business lobbies –
notably the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai,
the U.S. China Business Council – pressured the Chinese
government to minimize the protections afforded to work-
ers in China’s new contract law, and threatened that mem-
bers may leave the country if “flexibility” was reduced.73 The
pressure worked, too: some worker protections were
removed in later drafts of the law.74 The European Chamber
of Commerce in Beijing initially spoke out against the law
but later reversed its stance after pressure from the
European Trade Union Confederation and others. Some
Hong-Kong based business groups like the Federation of
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Seasonality of tracksuit imports into the US, 2004-2007
Hong Kong Industries are continuing to push for changes
to or exemptions from the law.75
To their credit, Nike publicly supported provisions on con-
tracting in the new law, saying, “We support the require-
ment of long-term labor contracts in the supply chain to
reduce the abuse of short-term contracts, e.g., to avoid
insurance and benefit provisions.”76
Even where the law is clear, however, it is often not ade-
quately enforced. Therefore, sportswear brands and manu-
facturers should, at minimum, ensure that they and their
suppliers and their subcontractors are complying with
national laws on labour contracts and dispatched labour
and that they are not using contract labour to avoid meet-
ing legal obligations to workers.  We’ll look at other things
sportswear companies can do to provide more secure
employment in Chapter VI.
Factory Closures
THE HURDLE
One of the stark realities of work in the apparel
industry in recent years has been the dramatic
increase in  factory closures – a result of the
restructuring of production and changing sourc-
ing practices. Closures not only impact the thou-
sands of workers and their families who lose
their income. They also generate fear and insecu-
rity for workers at other facilities, who may be
more afraid of speaking up about working condi-
tions for fear of also losing their jobs. 
With the demise of the apparel and textiles import quota
system, companies – retailers, brands and manufacturers
– are restructuring their global supply chains and manufac-
turing networks with little regard for the negative impacts
on workers, their families, communities or countries. 
Compounding the pain of losing their jobs, workers are
often left without even legal entitlements to severance pay
or back wages because their employers either mismanage
finances or make no provisions to financially comply with
their legal obligations once the factory is closed. And while
the most obvious impacts of factory closures and retrench-
ment of workers are the direct job losses and economic
multiplier effects in communities, workers who remain on
the job at other factories are also impacted. The threat of
factory closures has been effectively used against union
organizing efforts or to convince workers to lie about work-
ing conditions to auditors who visit the factory on behalf of
buyers.77
While a few brand-sensitive sportswear companies are
willing to discuss how to minimize the negative impacts of
restructuring and consolidation, the vast majority refuse to
even consider whether they have an obligation to justify
their decisions to workers or communities that will be neg-
atively affected. 
Disastrous impacts
The classic case of a disastrous closure is Hermosa
Manufacturing in El Salvador, which produced apparel at
various times for Nike, Russell Athletic, adidas and Puma.
The factory closed in 2005, leaving workers without jobs,
without back wages, without severance pay, without hous-
ing, and – because the owner failed to remit payments to
government social security funds despite deducting
employee contributions from workers, wages – without
health insurance or pensions. Three years later, the work-
ers have still been unable to collect their legal entitle-
ments.XVI
Hermosa, unfortunately, is only one of a steadily growing
list of apparel factories that have closed around the world
(often with similar failures on the part of owners and gov-
ernments to meet their legal responsibilities) in the wake
of the phase-out of quotas on apparel and textiles.  
While the most dramatic restructuring is happening in the
apparel industry, the athletic footwear sector, which under-
went a general process of consolidation in the 1980s, is
still not immune to massive factory closures and the relo-
cation of production.
• In November 2006, Indonesian shoe factories PT Spotec
and PT Dong Joe closed leaving 10,500 workers without
jobs. A third factory, PT Tong Yang, also closed, putting
9,000 workers out of work. All three factories produced
for Reebok and subsequently for adidas after it acquired
Reebok. By the time of this writing, well over a year after
the factories were closed and nearly 20,000 workers left
jobless; the majority of PT Spotec and PT Dong Joe work-
ers still have not received their full severance pay and
other legal entitlements. Continuing efforts by adidas to
encourage the rehiring of PT Spotec workers at the facto-
XVI. For a full discussion of the Hermosa closure, including recommendations for avoiding “future Hermosas”, see Maquila Solidarity Network.
Emergency Assistance, Redress and Prevention in the Hermosa Manufacturing Case. 2007. Available at:
www.maquilasolidarity.org/en/currentcampaigns/Hermosa/MSNReport 
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ry, which is being re-opened by different owners, have
not yet resulted in re-employment for the workers. 
• Elegant Top Shoes Co. Ltd. in Dongguan, China, eliminat-
ed 4,000 jobs when it closed its doors on December 20,
2007, after nearly 20 years of producing for major brands
like Reebok and adidas. While there are any number of
possible reasons for the closure, sources cited increased
costs associated with the new Chinese contract labour
law, changes in the exchange rate (which lessen the value
of prices paid by US buyers in relation to fixed local
costs), and the availability of cheaper labour further
inland.78
While the lack of transparency in the industry makes it dif-
ficult to determine the exact reasons for specific closures
of apparel and shoe factories, closures aren’t an economic
inevitability. They are a consequence of a specific, unsta-
ble, irresponsible, and unsustainable business model that
we discussed in Chapter I. 
Retailers and brands make decisions about where to
source production based on a number of considerations
including: price, delivery times, transport costs, quality
and, for some, compliance with company codes of con-
duct. Trade agreements also play a key role in determining
choice of production location by applying or eliminating
cross-border tariffs and quotas on the finished product. 
Although import quotas that dispersed apparel production
to all corners of the globe are being eliminated, it’s not at
all clear that instability in the apparel industry will disap-
pear with industry consolidation. Some large retailers and
buyers will consolidate a higher percentage of their pro-
duction in fewer first-tier factories in fewer countries.
However, vertical subcontracting will continue to feature in
the supply chains of these companies. The growth of the
Asian trading and production transnational corporations,
discussed in Chapter I, is creating an hourglass model
where consolidation may appear to take place in the mid-
dle section – but at the bottom we continue to see a pat-
tern of global shifts and unstable sourcing practices. 
In order to develop a sustainable business model in which
neither workers nor suppliers are subjected to unstable
orders and precarious employment, brands and retailers
must develop long-term, stable and direct relationships
with supply factories.XVII Brands and retailers will also need
to develop purchasing practices that prioritize labour rights
compliance over slight reductions in unit prices that might
be obtained by continually shifting production to ever
cheaper locales. We will return to this in Chapter VI.
Economic viability
Closures should only occur when a factory is no longer able
to sustain itself economically and all other options to res-
cue the business have been exhausted. However, it’s not
always easy to disentangle the responsibility for economic
decisions that affect the viability of a particular factory. 
Suppliers and/or buying agents using multiple factories in
one or more countries, for instance, can make choices about
which factories receive which orders, affecting the viability of
one or another facility. Buyers can also, either by decision or
simply by neglect, fail to support facilities that have been
more compliant with labour standards – especially those with
collective bargaining agreements – leading to closures. 
Both conditions appear to have been at play at the BJ&B
cap factory in the Dominican Republic. Workers at the fac-
tory faced a crisis in early 2007 when BJ&B’s Korean parent
company, Yupoong, announced its upcoming closure. In
2001 and 2002, the BJ&B factory had been the site of a
union organizing effort that, following efforts by interna-
tional labour rights organizations and multi-stakeholder
initiatives, including the Worker Rights Consortium and the
Fair Labor Association, and buyers like Nike, adidas and
Reebok, resulted in a groundbreaking collective bargaining
agreement.79
In subsequent years, however, Yupoong had been steadily
disinvesting from the BJ&B factory – so much so that the
factory, which stood at 2000 employees in 2001, had only
350 left at the time of announcement of closure. The own-
ers cited its lack of competitiveness with other Yupoong
factories in Bangladesh and Vietnam as the reason for the
closure. As well, buyers like Reebok had been pulling out of
the factory, leaving Nike as the sole remaining major buyer
at the time of closure.
The economic starvation of this unionized facility – in
favour of non-union Yupoong facilities in lower-wage coun-
tries – stands as a stark reminder of the failure by the
industry to reward labour rights compliance with increased
orders.   
The BJ&B case is also a reminder that, because we are
dealing with global supply chains, a narrow assessment of
one isolated facility’s economic viability is not sufficient to
rationalize a closure. A true assessment of a facility’s eco-
nomic viability must also take into account the order pat-
terns from buyers, whether prices paid by buyers are suffi-
cient to allow for labour rights compliance at a facility, and
the finances of the parent company. 
And, once again, because of the multiplicity of buyers at
any one factory, collaborative efforts by buyers and suppli-
XVII. Brands might also consider acquiring and controlling their own production facilities.
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ers, along with trade unions, NGOs and governments, must
be pursued to address the viability of a shared facility and
work to avoid closures.
When a factory closes
When a factory closure cannot be prevented, both buyers
and the factory owner have a responsibility to ensure that
best practices in reducing the negative impacts on workers
and their communities are followed. 
The key international standard is the ILO Convention on
Termination of Employment (No. 158), which stresses con-
sultation with workers or their representatives on alterna-
tives to closure, adequate notice to workers, payment of
severance, and assurance that redundancies are non-dis-
criminatory. ILO Convention on Protection of Workers’
Claims in Case of Employer’s Insolvency (No. 173) also
states that workers’ claims to severance pay or other legal-
ly-due compensation from their former employer must take
precedence over the non-protected financial claims on the
employer, such as those of the government. 
But sportswear companies can and should do more than
the bare minimum when addressing the disastrous
impacts of factory closures. We will look at what can be
done in Chapter VI. 
Living Wages
THE HURDLE
Despite increasing attention to this issue – by
multi-stakeholder initiatives, labour rights
advocates and academics – there has been lit-
tle or no progress on ensuring that workers
who make sportswear products earn a wage
that is sufficient to meet their basic needs.  
Not only have workers at the bottom of the supply chain
been forced to bear the lion’s share of risks associated with
the industry’s demand for flexibility, they have also been
forced to shoulder the costs associated with consumer
demand for low prices. 
“We have a very difficult life…,” wrote a group of migrant
workers in Shenzhen, China, in a March 2007 letter to gov-
ernment officials, as inflation in their region made their
already paltry wages worth even less.80
“Statistics show that the consumers’ index has increased
by 4.4 percent in June 2007, when compared with the
same period last year,” said the letter. “For food and rent,
the increase is more than 10 percent. If our wages remain
the same or are reduced, how can we support our families?
How can we save money? If we can’t support our families
and save money, then what is the point of working here?”
The minimum wage in Shenzhen at the time was
RMB700/month (US$100).XVIII Raising a family on the base
wage, even with both partners working, was next to impos-
sible.81 What’s worse, with inflation rates on basic items like
food in Guangdong province skyrocketing in the past year,
workers’ real incomes – even after minimum wage increas-
es – have plummeted in value.82
To get by, workers typically rely on overtime hours and pro-
duction and attendance bonuses, which can raise their
salaries to anywhere from RMB900 to RMB1,400 (US$128-
200) per month. For comparison purposes, a pair of adidas
running shoes in Shenzhen can cost anywhere between
RMB600 and RMB1,200 (US$86-171) – almost a month’s
income for the workers that made them.83
Many workers lodge in company dormitories (often with
twelve workers to a room) and eat in the company canteen.
While young, female migrant workers, who form a large
portion of the industry’s workforce, do not generally have
children to provide for, they do try to earn enough money
to send home a portion to support their families. 
Shenzhen workers are not alone in facing poverty wages in
the industry. Their concern is shared by sportswear workers
the world over: 
• Workers at Yue Yuen factories in Dongguan, China, work on
average 10-12 hours a day to produce sports shoes for
major sportswear brands. They face intense pressure to
meet high production quotas. And yet some of these work-
ers receive only RMB900/month – around US$0.53 an
hour.XIX Workers at one Yue Yuen subcontractor in the area
receive only RMB500-600/month (US$71-86) – less than
the legal minimum – despite working 12-13 hours a day.84
• Home-based workers stitching soccer balls in Jalandhar,
India, told Play Fair researchers that piece rates have
remained stagnant for the last five years, despite local
XVIII. Partly in response to pressure from workers like the authors of the letter, the minimum wage in Shenzen was raised to RMB750/month in
October, 2007 
XIX. Nike recently boasted to reporters of the RMB1,472 made by Yue Yuen workers at a Dongguan plant (see Mitchell, Tom. “As Inflation bites, China
Inc looks beyond low costs”, Financial Times China, 17 March 2008). Play Fair research, detailed in Chapter IV, shows that this is not a normal income
in Yue Yuen factories.
XX. See Chapter V for more information, sources and methodology.
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inflation rates last year estimated at between 6.7% and
10%. Depending on the type of ball being produced, a
home-based hand stitcher makes between US$0.35 and
US$0.88, completing two to four balls a day.XX
• Soccer ball stitchers in Pakistan report that they receive
between US$0.57 and US$0.65 for each ball they stitch,
a rate that hasn’t changed in six years even though the
consumer price index rose by 40% over that period.85
• Garment workers in Cambodia earn an average of US$70
to US$80 a month, including overtime and bonuses –
not enough to provide a worker and family with a decent
standard of living.86
• Sri Lanka’s living wage has been estimated at LKR12,504
(US$116) per month for garment workers living in free
trade zone areas and LKR10,183 (US$94.46) for those liv-
ing outside free trade zones.87 However, most workers in
the garment sector earn an average of LKR8,779 ($US81)
inside the zones and LKR7,364 (US$68) outside,XXI even
with overtime, attendance and production bonuses
included.88 The minimum wage of garment workers was
increased in 2006 to LKR6,000 (US$56) per month589 –
still less than half the estimated living wage, especially
given Sri Lanka’s high level of inflation. 
• In March and April, 2008, strikes broke out at sports shoe
factories in Vietnam, where workers wages have not been
able to keep pace with double-digit inflation on basic
goods.91
• In Bangladesh, where mass protests by garment workers
broke out in 2006, the minimum wage was raised from
BDT900/month (US$13) to BDT1,662.50/month
(US$24.30). Bangladeshi trade unions estimate the living
wage at the time was closer to BDT4,800 (US$70).92
• In Turkey, the prevailing industry wage in the garment
sector is estimated to be less than half the living wage.93
In a globalized economy, inadequate wages are not solely
the result of local economic factors. Governments and local
manufacturers are well aware that if the minimum wage or
prevailing industry wage improves in one country, there is
a very real danger that international companies will move
production to another country with cheaper labour. Recall
the closure of the BJ&B factory in the Dominican Republic
in favour of other Yupoong factories in Vietnam and
Bangladesh. At the time, wages at the BJ&B factory were
worth approximately US$125.79/month. Wages in
Bangladesh were as low as US$49.88/month – 24 cents
an hour.94
Why don’t sportswear companies pay a living wage?
When confronted with the question of why they don’t pay a
living wage, sportswear companies have responded with
the following arguments: 
• Wages should be set by local market forces and/or col-
lective bargaining; and
• Determining a living wage is complicated and a reliable
system does not exist.
Market forces and collective bargaining
According to the Fair Labor Association (FLA), to which
many sportswear companies belong, “experience shows
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at a region-spe-
cific living wage.”95 The FLA argues, “We should be creating
incentives and undertaking capacity building to encourage
worker representation and collective bargaining to allow
workers and employers to arrive at a wage level that
reflects the domestic situation.”96
While no one would disagree that enabling collective bar-
gaining to reach a desired wage level is preferable to other
methods of establishing appropriate wage levels, the
impediments to freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining we have described above limit this option in the
immediate term – especially given the propensity of
sportswear companies to locate production in jurisdictions
where freedom of association and collective bargaining are
legally restricted. 
Further, the ability of local markets to set adequate wage
levels is extremely limited  when the industry is not con-
strained by national borders and its most powerful players
can (and do) relocate production to other jurisdictions
whenever wage levels or other production costs rise. To
argue that it is the responsibility of local jurisdictions to set
adequate wages levels without a firm commitment by for-
eign investors and buyers to retain production in-country is
disingenuous at best.XXII
Prices paid to suppliers
“Today price, quality and delivery are no longer vari-
ables. Today, the buyer has a fixed target price, a fixed
quality standard, and a fixed garment delivery date. If
the factory cannot meet the buyer’s target price, the
buyer will go elsewhere.” 97 -- David Birnbaum, industry
analyst, October 2006.
XXI. The difference in wages between the two groups of workers can be at least partially attributed to the higher levels of overtime demanded of wor-
kers inside the zones.
XXII. Nonetheless, governments do retain responsibility to set minimum wages, which should be done in a manner consistent with ILO Conventions
28 and 131. 
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Local market forces are still relevant, not only to the meas-
urement of what constitutes a living wage in a specific con-
text, but also to the ability to achieve improved wages.
However, wage levels in factories producing sportswear,
for export are not constrained solely by local markets, they
are also dependent on the prices set by buyers in a global
market. When prices paid to suppliers fall, workers ability
to achieve a higher wage, in either a local market or collec-
tive bargaining context, is further constrained. 
Because hard data on actual prices paid by buyers to sup-
pliers is a closely guarded secret, it is difficult to confirm
anecdotal information on trends in pricing. However
reports of downward price pressure in the sportswear
industry are widespread. 
Figure 3 shows the change in local value of the US import
price per pair of sports shoes, which despite fluctuations,
fell in all four primary producing countries in 2007.98 In
Indonesia, where some sources estimate that production
costs in footwear have increased by 3.5% per year,99 the
local value of average import prices paid by US buyers for
sports footwear fell almost 19% last year.
FIGURE 3: 
Percentage Change in local value of US sports shoe import prices
The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that
prices paid to Cambodian apparel manufacturers fell by
4.47% in 2005 compared to 2004. The ILO reports that “a
leading international buyer has confirmed this trend citing
a 60% increase in pieces made in Cambodia with a 7%
average price reduction per piece.”100 The Garment
Manufacturers’ Association in Cambodia recently estimat-
ed that “from 2006 to 2007, our prices have dropped by
about 10% and continue to drop as we speak.”101
At the same time, prices paid to suppliers can vary by coun-
try and by supplier, and their real local value can vary
depending on fluctuating exchange rates. In China, for
example, there have been reports of rising prices,102
although prices are still low relative to the world average,103
and their local value may have been offset by increases in
the exchange rate of the Chinese yuen. 
Sporting goods manufacturers in Jalandhar, India told Play
Fair researchers that the falling US dollar has impacted
their bottom line. With rates quoted to brands in dollars,
they reported significant erosion of profits.104 Meanwhile,
the cost of PVC, made in India from imported petroleum,
has “more than doubled,” according to one manufactur-
er.105 While these manufacturers claimed that they had not
passed on the losses to workers through cuts in piece
rates, at least two workers asserted that they had seen
rates drop in recent months, with the drop in the dollar
explicitly cited as the cause.106
There is no blanket formula to determine whether a price is
sufficient to allow a particular supplier to pay a living wage
– with reference to their factory’s productivity, use of mate-
rials, work organization, profit levels, costs of compliance
with local regulatory regimes and other factors. The impor-
tant point, however, is that living wages cannot be
achieved solely in the local market context if prevailing
prices paid to suppliers limit their ability to pay such
wages. For this reason buyers, and not just factory manage-
ment, must play a role in working to improve the wages of
the workers that make their products.  
Defining a living wage
Achieving agreement on one definition of a living wage has
been difficult. Perhaps the most common formulation has
been that wages must be “sufficient to meet basic needs of
workers and their families and provide some discretionary
XXIII. There are some international benchmarks that should be taken into account, however. Article 23.3 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration
on Human Rights stipulates: “Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence
worthy of human dignity…”. Article 25 stipulates: In 1928, the ILO adopted Convention 26, which required signatory nations to establish a minimum
wage fixing body. In 1970, the ILO adopted Convention 131, which delineated the factors that must be included in the calculation of a minimum
wage, including “the need of workers and their families, their general level of wages in the country, the cost of living, social security benefits, relative
living standards of other social groups, requirements of economic development, the country's level of productivity and maintenance of high levels of
employment.”
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income.”107 How that is measured in practice has been a
subject of debate, and a multitude of mathematical formu-
las and approaches have proliferated over the years. Even
the terms – such as what constitutes “basic needs” – are
hotly contested.XXIII
Rather than focusing on the abstract question of how to
develop a universal formula for measuring a living wage,
sportswear brands, manufacturers and the multi-stake-
holder initiatives to which they belong should turn their
attention to the practical question of how to increase work-
ers’ wages to a point where they at least fall within a range
of nationally-determined living wage estimates – rather
than allowing wages to remain at poverty levels while aca-
demic discussion continues. 
On the question of how to improve wages, sportswear
brands and the multi-stakeholder initiative to which the
largest brands are members, the FLA, respond as follows:
• Individual buyers do not have the leverage to demand
increased wages at supplier factories; and
• Wages will rise as productivity and skills improve.
Meanwhile sportswear manufacturers argue that they can-
not raise wages while prices paid by the buyers remain low.
Productivity is no cure-all
While some leading sportswear brand buyers acknowledge
that wages need to increase, they tend to look to improve-
ments in manufacturing efficiency and productivity to sup-
ply the necessary economic margins to increase wages at a
factory level. To this end, sportswear brands like Nike and
adidas have worked with core suppliers to improve effi-
ciency and introduce “lean” manufacturing systems.
Lean manufacturing uses teams of workers who manufac-
ture the entire product – start to finish – rather than per-
forming only one repetitive task in a long production line.
Although lean systems tend to be more efficient, more flex-
ible, and ultimately more productive, the evidence that
they will automatically result in increases in workers’ wages
or total incomes is far from established. 
A study of a Chinese sports shoe factory that recently con-
verted to lean manufacturing shows dramatic improve-
ments in efficiency, flexibility, quality and profitability.
However, the study concludes, “Positive impacts on work-
ers’ wages and hours are not as clear.”108
The study also noted that in individual surveys and focus-
group meetings, workers described “increased production
pressures and individual stress levels under lean produc-
tion.”109
Greater intensification of work and use of group [production]
goal pay systems also increase the stress generated by work
operations as workers take fewer breaks to maximize produc-
tion and are also tied to the work pace and rhythm of their co-
workers rather than their own schedules.110
“Some departments in this factory,” the study found,
“worked employees up to 274 hours a month during the
first half of 2006.”111
While other studies have concluded that some factories
with lean systems have increased workers’ incomes,112 they
do not tend to include hard data on increases in total com-
pensation, nor do they detail how those increases were
achieved. In another often cited study, production bonus-
es were used in a number of Chinese factories as a way to
increase pay packages for normal working hours, but most
of the recorded increases showed that the only change was
that more workers at the factory were making the legal
minimum wage.113
One interesting study of two Mexican factories producing
for Nike, however, found higher wages at the factory using
lean production systems, partly attributed to the method
of calculating production targets collectively rather than
individually.114 The study’s authors warned, however:
It is important not to conflate particular production sys-
tems with differences in workplace conditions. Although
lean production lends itself to management practices such
as increased training and autonomous work teams, there is
no automatic link between this system of work organiza-
tion and better working conditions.115
With that warning in mind, in the next chapter we will see
how production targets have been raised to unattainable
levels at a number of Chinese footwear factories that run
on the lean system, generating high work stress while elim-
inating promised improvements in overall compensation. 
Nike touts the benefits of lean production in their latest
Corporate Social Responsibility report, noting that both
Nike and its suppliers have seen savings from the transi-
tion to lean manufacturing, which, for Nike, is estimated at
15 cents for each pair of shoes produced under the lean
model for more than twelve months. The company says it
is reinvesting those savings in “growth strategies.” Contract
XXIV. Impacts on worker health and safety can include increased exposure to chemicals and noise that was previously segregated, as well as ergono-
mic and stress-related effects. See Brown, Garrett and O’Rourke, Dara. “Lean Manufacturing Comes to China.” International Journal on Occupation and
Environmental Health 2007: 13
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factories are apparently not divulging to Nike how they
spend any savings.116
Increases in productivity, reductions in waste and better
organization of the workplace are positive goals in and of
themselves, as long as they do not negatively impact on
workers’ health.XXIV If these changes can also deliver
increases in wages, they would be very welcome. At the
moment, however, the jury is still out on whether increased
productivity is the cure-all for low wages that some compa-
nies believe it to be. 
More to the point, even if gains in productivity can be made
through re-organization of production, and even if this
could be done without unduly increasing the already
intense pressure on workers and the long overtime hours
workers currently face, there is still no guarantee that any
savings achieved through lean production would accrue to
workers. In fact, without collective bargaining and/or
proactive steps on the part of the industry to ensure that
workers receive a share of increasing factory margins, there
is little reason to believe that reductions in costs will result
in anything other than higher profits for factory owners
and/or lower prices for buyers. 
Who holds the purse strings?
Responsibility for achieving wage gains in global sports-
wear supply chains is more widely distributed than it might
be in a national industry producing for domestic consump-
tion because global sportswear production takes place in a
context of: 
• unstable buying relationships; 
• difficulties with national wage setting mechanisms due to
footloose sourcing and investment; 
• lack of respect for freedom of association and collective
bargaining; and 
• low price expectations by consumers, brands and retailers.
Although buyers do not own the factories where their
goods are produced and therefore do not directly pay the
workers who make their products, their purchasing prac-
tices, and particularly the prices they pay to their suppliers,
can play a significant role in determining wage rates.
Suppliers who own the factories do establish pay rates,
either independently or through collective bargaining, but
their ability to raise wages is limited by the prices paid by
buyers and the threat that a higher price will result in buy-
ers shifting production elsewhere. 
While buyers could pay higher prices to suppliers and/or
suppliers could improve productivity and reduce costs,
these changes will not automatically translate into
improved wages for workers. Without some mechanism of
ensuring that workers receive the premium from either of
these initiatives in the form of higher wages, this could
result in nothing more than higher profits for factory own-
ers. Further, while one buyer may be willing to take a pro-
gressive approach to pricing and sourcing practices, that
effort can be undermined by the practices of other buyers
using the same factory. 
For these reasons, a coordinated effort to increasing wages in
the sportswear industry must be developed. Such an effort
should focus initially on major suppliers and relatively stable
factories where a critical mass of buyers with a long-term rela-
tionship to the supplier and the factory are willing to take
steps to ensure that workers receive wages that fall within the
range of living wage estimates for the region. We will look
closer at how this might be achieved in Chapters VI and VII.  
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 Some may remember the well-publicized story about 56
Vietnamese women making Nike shoes who, in 1996, were
made to run 4km around the factory as punishment for
wearing “non-regulation” shoes at work. Unlike Olympic
runners, these women were not rewarded with medals.
Twelve women fainted and were taken to hospital.117
The women were working at a factory owned by the Pou
Chen Group, a Taiwanese sportswear giant founded by the
Tsai family in 1969. Initially, the company produced basic
rubber shoes such as PVC sandals and slippers. Over the
next 40 years, Pou Chen and its wholly-owned subsidiary
Yue Yuen grew to be the largest footwear manufacturer in
the world, employing approximately 300,000 workers.118
And even though one in six sport shoes are now made in a
Yue Yuen factory,119 most Western consumers have never
heard of the company. 
Yue Yuen produces footwear for over 30 brand-name cor-
porations including Nike, adidas, Reebok, Puma, Fila,
ASICS, New Balance, and Converse. It also produces for
important “brown” [non sports] shoe brands like
Timberland, Rockport, Clarks, and Dr Martens. Many of
these brands have established long-term relationships
with Yue Yuen. 
Yue Yuen is an example of the kind of manufacturing
transnational we spoke about in Chapter I. It’s critical to
better understand these important industry players.
Because Yue Yuen produces for so many major brands, and
because it is a powerful player in the industry in its own
right, the company’s manufacturing network would be a
good place for the sportswear industry to begin to collabo-
rate on seeking solutions to workers’ concerns over wages
and working conditions. 
Yue Yuen vaults into first place
Adidas started to order shoes from Pou Chen in 1979, a
relationship that continues to this day.120 In 1985, Reebok
designated Pou Chen as its most important producer, and
Nike followed suit in the early 1990s. 
Labour shortages, wage increases and currency apprecia-
tion pushed Pou Chen to disperse production sites to
China (1988), Indonesia (1993) and Vietnam (1995). Yue
Yuen even operates a few production lines in the US, where
it produces shoes for New Balance.121
The main vehicle for this overseas expansion, Yue Yuen
Industrial Holdings, was established by Tsai Chi Jen – the
brother of Pou Chen’s founder – in order to facilitate
expansion in China in 1988. 
China
By 2007, Yue Yuen operated 210 production lines in
China.122 These factories employ about 70 per cent of its
total workforce.123
Several of Yue Yuen’s largest factories are in GaoBu,
Dongguan City in Guangdong province. By 2002, according
to China Labour Watch, those factories employed 40,000
workers in the low season to 50,000 workers in the peak
season.124Other Yue Yuen Guangdong production facilities
are located in Huangjiang Town, Dongguan City; Sanxiang
Zhongshan City; and Jida Industrial District, Zhuhai City.125
Clustered nearby are factories that supply footwear materi-
als like leather and glue. 
China is expected to remain Yue Yuen’s most important
production site in the near future, although some produc-
tion lines might move inland to cheaper wage areas, and
expansion of production in Vietnam and Indonesia is cur-
rently underway.126
Indonesia
Yue Yuen has been active in Indonesia since 1993 when it
invested $100 million in the Nikomas Gemilang factory
complex, sometimes called Niketown. 
Some 43,000 workers (85% women) produce shoes for
Nike, adidas, Puma and Ecco in this complex of 50 build-
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ings, located near Jakarta, while Nike Converse footwear is
made in a second factory employing 4,000 workers in
Sukabumi.127 The Nikomas factories are segregated by com-
pany, with adidas, Puma and Nike production lines taking
place in different buildings. Twenty buildings are dedicated
to adidas production, eight are dedicated to Nike, and 11
are dedicated to Puma. One building produces goods for
Ecco brand. 
Vietnam
The footwear industry is one of Vietnam’s fastest growing
export sectors. In 1990, Vietnam exported 750,000 pairs
of sports shoes. By 1998, that number had grown to 140
million pairs.128
Yue Yuen started to produce sports shoes in Vietnam in
1995. By 2006, the company was operating 117 produc-
tion lines, making Vietnam Yue Yuen’s second largest pro-
duction site after China.XXV
One reason that Vietnam has become such an important
production site for Yue Yuen is the normalization of trade
relations between Vietnam and the United States and
Vietnam’s entry into the WTO, which has reduced or elimi-
nated tariffs and broadened trade. A second (and increas-
ingly relevant) reason is that Vietnam’s labour costs are
considerably lower than those in China. 
The Yue Yuen business model
One analyst described Yue Yuen as “the dedicated factory”
enabling brands to outsource their manufacturing capabil-
ities so the brand can concentrate on designing, marketing
Yue Yuen has become one of the largest sportswear retail-
ers in China, where its retail outlets sell branded products
of Nike, Reebok, adidas, Puma and Li Ning. Yue Yuen
reported a massive 48.8% growth in the company’s retail
sales in China between 2006 and 2007.136
and licensing.132 Another analyst put it this way: “Yue Yuen
operates like an independent recording studio, opening its
doors (for a fee) to any musician with a song to record.”133
Unlike smaller suppliers, Yue Yuen has used massive
economies of scale to lower average production costs, fur-
ther cementing its position as a major player in the industry. 
Yue Yuen’s scale and capacity allow it to react swiftly to
rush orders or to reduce the time needed to change pro-
duction layouts and processes in order to manufacture and
deliver a new product. 
Despite its huge workforce, the company has been very
successful in keeping labour costs down.  Figure 4 below
shows that direct labour costs in 2004 were running at only
12% of its total unit costs. More recently, Nike (one of Yue
Yuen’s biggest customers) estimates that average labour
costs in footwear production account for only 10% of the
unit price.134 For comparison, direct labour costs at Anta
Sports accounted for approximately 14.5% of unit prices in
2006.135
In addition to manufacturing, Yue Yuen has also estab-
lished a rapidly growing wholesale network of distributors
and hundreds of branded athletic and casual footwear and
apparel retail stores in cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou,
Shanghai, Shenzhen and Dalian. The company plans to
operate a total of 3,000 stores by 2009.
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XXV. The company currently has 210 lines in mainland China, 117 in Vietnam and 71 in Indonesia. See Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) Ltd. Annual
Report, 2007. p15
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Profits and prices
Yue Yuen grew from a company generating US$197m in
sales in 1992 into one generating sales of US$4.1 billion in
2007.137 In this same period, its profit went up from $US95
million to US$387 million. In fact, Yue Yuen’s profits are
now higher than many sportswear brands.
Yue Yuen’s size and the complementary services it pro-
vides to buyers strengthen its bargaining power in the sup-
ply chain, so that even now when rising raw material costs
could potentially squeeze Yue Yuen’s footwear manufactur-
ing margin, financial analysts have noted that Yue Yuen is
able to pass on higher material costs to its customers,
albeit with a 3- to 6-month time lag.138 Similar production
cost increases might have pushed smaller manufacturers
out of the market.139
If Yue Yuen is so powerful – and profitable – why are Yue
Yuen workers still not receiving a living wage?
The Other Story: What Do Workers Say?
Despite more than 15 years of codes of conduct adopted
by Yue Yuen’s big brand customers – and Yue Yuen’s own
code of conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility pro-
gram, adopted in 2005 – Yue Yuen workers are still not
being paid a living wage. In many cases, Play Fair
researchers discovered, workers are not even receiving the
legal minimum wage. 
“In the past, it was all about whether you could
hit the workers or slap them. Now we talk
about how we celebrate their birthdays.” –
Thomas Shih, a deputy Yue Yuen manager in a
Chinese factory. 140
“People are always talking about human
rights and welfare. In 1989, people never did
that. That was my golden time. No one
squeezed me.” – Allen Lee, a manager in Pou
Chen’s Yue Yuen factory in Southern Chinai.141 
Over the years, numerous reports by NGOs and labour
activists have revealed workers’ rights violations at Yue
Yuen factories. Most of the allegations concerned abusive
treatment of workers (associated with a militaristic style of
management), sexual harassment, forced and excessive
overtime, low wages (in many cases, less than the national
minimum wage), poor safety standards, unjust employ-
ment contracts, limited access to toilets, and repression of
(independent) unions.142
Between September 2006 and August 2007, Play Fair
researchers in China carried out extensive research on
working conditions in thirteen wholly-owned Yue Yuen fac-
tories, three Yue Yuen/Pou Chen part-owned facilities, and
four Yue Yuen/Pou Chen subcontract facilities operating in
China.XXVI Other Play Fair researchers investigated condi-
tions in two Indonesian Yue Yuen factories in January
2008.XXVII I We present some of these findings below.XXVIII 
Long hours and the pressure to produce
Workers at Yue Yuen factories in China regularly com-
plained about heavy work pressure and resulting stress. 
“I am exhausted to death now,” one worker at a Yue Yuen
owned factory in Dongguan, China, told the Play Fair
researchers. She assembles shoes for New Balance. “The
two of us have to glue 120 pairs of shoes every hour…. We
are working without rest and are always afraid of not work-
ing fast enough to supply soles to the next production line.
XXVI. Play Fair researchers interviewed 15 workers at each factory, including at least one worker from each production department. The male/female
ratio for interview subjects was approximately 3:7. All the interviews were done off site, in the community or in the rented places where workers live.
We also used secondary materials including company profiles, reports, newspaper articles, internet postings, and factory advertisements.
XXVII. Play Fair researchers interviewed 11 workers (six women and five men), divided into 3 focus groups and 2 individual interviews. The workers
were aged between 20 and 38, with a median age of 25. All had been working for Yue Yuen for more than one year, with the median length of service
being six years, five months.
XXVIII. Note that specific factory names are not used in this section of the report in order to protect workers. Factories are indentified by a number in
the endnotes, for reference purposes.
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If we slow down, the next production line could be slowed
down as well. The supervisors are pressuring and nagging
us all the time. We are tired and dirty.”143
High production targets force workers to cut their lunch
hour short. Mid-shift breaks are often cancelled. Work that
used to be done in ten hours is now expected to be fin-
ished in nine. While the factory can claim to have reduced
overtime hours, as required in many brand codes of con-
duct, the workers are still expected to produce the same
number of pieces, leading to exhaustion and burnout.
“Sometimes I don’t have time to go to the toilet or to get a
drink of water,” said another thirty-year old woman worker.
“Although we have less overtime now, it is as exhausting as
before. Maybe more.”144
In some Yue Yuen factories materials 12-hour work days
were the norm.145 The company has made efforts to control
excessive overtime hours, but in these factories workers
complained about much heavier work stress caused by
tightened production schedules and new production sys-
tems introduced by management to offset the reduction in
working hours.146
In a Yue Yuen factory producing, for adidas, New Balance,
Nike, Timberland and Reebok (now owned by adidas)
shoes, overtime was officially capped at two hours, but at
the same time the lunch hour was cut in half to ensure
workers could complete their quotas – effectively adding
an extra 30 minutes to their day that is not compensated
as overtime.147 Workers at other factories also reported
shortened lunch breaks, sometimes taking as little as ten
minutes to eat so they can return to their stations to meet
heightened production quotas.148
At six of the Yue Yuen factories that were studied in China,
workers are expected to meet their production quotas
before leaving work. Extra hours are not recorded as over-
time so that, even while workers toil longer, on paper excess
overtime appears to be controlled.149 In three of those facto-
ries, workers were told not to punch the clock for extra hours
so that no record of excessive overtime is kept.150
At one factory, workers reported working 2-3 hours unpaid
overtime on a regular basis – on top of the 2 hours official-
ly scheduled overtime. Workers at that factory reported
receiving no days off during the peak season, a complaint
that was shared by workers at other Yue Yuen factories and
subcontract factories.151 Workers at one subcontract facility
don’t receive any of the statutory holidays to which they
are legally entitled – they remain on the job, where they
work 4-5 hours overtime per day on a regular basis.152
Getting overtime under control seems to be a key demand
of many buyers. In Indonesia, efforts to control excessive
overtime were also negotiated with the union at the
Nikomas facility, and overtime problems have improved on
some lines. However, workers still report similar problems. 
“It is true that Nike and Adidas have tried to be strict [on
excessive overtime],” one worker told us. According to this
worker, who has been making Nike shoes for a number of
years, production targets and expected overtime hours for
each day are set out in a written Overtime Order at a morn-
ing briefing. “However, there seems to be a catch,” he said.
“For example, when the Overtime Order states that over-
time for the day is only 2 hours, then the overtime record-
ed is only 2 hours – even if, in reality, we worked 3 hours
overtime.” 
Workers on Puma lines reportedly work at least three – and
sometimes up to six – hours overtime each day. Workers
on adidas lines also report working up to four hours over-
time a day (up to 70 hours a week). In addition there is
what is known as “loyalty time” where workers are expect-
ed to turn up 15 minutes before their shift starts to do exer-
cises and clean and prepare the machines, and to work an
extra 15 minutes after their shift end. This half hour in total
is unpaid overtime.153
“Women with children are more vulnerable,” said one
woman working on a Puma line. “The excessive overtime
takes time away from their family.”
Disciplinary Practices and Verbal abuse
Many workers complained about harsh disciplinary prac-
tices and verbal abuse. A number of the factories investi-
gated used a system of fines for workers who did not meet
quality standards, sometimes fining supervisors as well,
which added to the pressure on workers.154 At ten of the
factories we investigated, workers reported that verbal
abuse was a problem.155
At one Chinese factory manufacturing for ASICS, workers
that failed to meet the production quota had to write a
‘psychoanalysis’ report to management explaining why
they could not meet the quota and to guarantee that they
would do better the next day.156 At another factory, pressure
to meet quotas was reinforced through the holding of pro-
duction meetings where workers that were considered not
sufficiently productive were openly criticised by manage-
ment in front of their co-workers.157
Verbal and physical abuse was also reported on the adidas
and Puma lines at the Nikomas factory. One worker related
an incident where a stopwatch was thrown at a worker in the
Puma unit. In the adidas unit assembly workers who refuse to
work overtime have been either transferred to unpleasant
work in the chemicals and rubber section or made to stand
up in the middle of the line for hours on end.158
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Dangerous working conditions
Intense work pressure can also impact on workers’ health.
Aside from occupational illnesses related to stress – which
were reported at some of the factories investigated159 –
workers also reported that even where safety equipment
was provided, they tended not to use it because it slowed
them down.160
Workers at other Chinese factories complained of chemical
exposure, skin allergies and upset stomachs.161 While some
factories provided safety equipment, others did not. 
In the unionized Nikomas factories in Indonesia, workers
reported that safety equipment is available and warnings
are posted everywhere, including information on specific
chemical hazards. However, one woman on the Puma lines
told Play Fair researchers that they are expected to wash
their paper-based mask until it is worn out. “It is not easy
to ask for a new mask. We give back the used mask, and
sometimes they grumble to us before giving us a new one.”
Workers at a number of Chinese Yue Yuen factories said they
were pressured not to report injuries to supervisors, who
would in turn face repercussions from upper management.162
While workers in some factories were properly insured for
injuries,163 others were required to pay out of pocket for med-
ical visits even at company-run clinics.164 Some factories –
mostly subcontractors, but including one wholly-owned facil-
ity – did not follow legal procedures for investigating, rating,
and compensating workplace injuries.165 A common problem
in most of the workplaces investigated was the failure to pro-
vide all four legally required worker insurance programs:
social security (pension), worker’s illness and injury insur-
ance, disability insurance, and maternity benefits.166 In many
factories, workers were not aware of whether they were cov-
ered by workplace injury insurance nor were they aware of
their rights in case of accidents.167
Media reports indicate that insurance, social welfare, safe
working conditions and wages were key issues in a March
2006 walkout by 8,000 workers at a Pou Chen factory in
Vietnam.168
Low wages
Workers are usually paid some combination of a base
wage and various bonuses based on the number of pieces
completed, attendance, and other measures. 
When the minimum wage in China was raised in
September 2006, management in most Yue Yuen factories
and subcontract facilities responded by raising the produc-
tion quota and reducing production bonuses and other
incentives. Some factories added new deductions from
workers’ compensation for housing, food, or other servic-
es.169 In the end, despite an increase in the legal minimum
wage, many workers were receiving the same or less com-
pensation than before the increase. 
When Dongguan’s minimum wage was raised to
RMB690/month (US$97) in September 2006, a Yue Yuen
factory producing for adidas raised the production quota
to 75 pairs of shoes per hour, which workers had trouble
meeting. As a result, production bonuses shrunk, and
many workers complained that the income they received
after deductions for food and lodging was even less than
before. A one-day work stoppage in October 2006 failed to
reverse the decision to raise quotas.170
The pattern was repeated at most of the Chinese factories
studied for this report. Skilled workers at one factory who
could make RMB400-500/month (US$57-$71) in produc-
tion bonuses previously are receiving only RMB100-
200/month (US$14-$28) after their employer raised quo-
tas.171 As a result, their total take home salary has not
increased.XXIX
At one Yue Yuen subcontract factory producing materials
for Reebok, Timberland, New Balance and Columbia
Sportswear shoe, workers are paid entirely by piece rate,
which means their wage varies depending on the number
of pieces completed. Workers at this factory receive on
average RMB500-600/month (US$71-$86) – less than the
legal minimum wage. From that, RMB155/month (US$22)
is deducted for lodging in the factory’s dormitories, where
12 workers occupy each room, with shared showers and
toilets on every second floor.172
Another Yue Yuen subcontractor was paying new workers
an exceptionally low basic wage of RMB290/month
(US$41), and RMB490/month (US$70) for senior workers.
Both rates are below the legal minimum. Some depart-
ments at this factory are paying only RMB1-2/hour
(US$0.14-$0.28) in overtime compensation, again less
than the legal minimum. As a result, a new worker clocking
more than 100 hours of overtime and 30 days of work per
month received only RMB700-800 (US$100-$114) in com-
pensation. Workers at this factory report that, to their
knowledge, Yue Yuen has never inspected the facility.173
XXIX. This pattern is not unique to Yue Yuen factories. Research conducted by the Thai Centre for Labour Rights at two factories producing for adidas
in Thailand in August 2006 found that production targets were regularly increased, eliminating potential bonuses. Workers told researchers they wan-
ted a stable production target (Thai Centre for Labour Rights, August 2006).  
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Improving conditions at Yue Yuen
Since Yue Yuen manufactures for various high profile
brands, the company has had to work with a number of
buyers on implementation of their codes of conduct,
including Nike, adidas, Puma and New Balance. Brand
pressure seems to have softened Yue Yuen’s disciplinary
methods. It has reportedly resulted in some improvements
in levels of overtime work and dormitory accommodations
for migrant labor.174 As reported above, some factories
have taken significant steps on health and safety issues,
and have followed legal requirements on social security,
worker’s compensation, disability insurance, and maternity
benefits. 
Yet there still appears to be little or no progress on the
issue of wages.
Why not pay a living wage?
As we have seen, critics of the idea of requiring payment of
a living wage often point to structural barriers that make it
difficult for any one entity in the supply chain to ensure
higher wages. 
The athletic footwear sector, however, has some notable
structural differences that differentiate it from the apparel
sector: 
• It is highly consolidated. Nike and adidas control almost
60% of the retail market. In the last few years, Nike has
acquired smaller brands like Converse and Umbro, and
adidas has acquired Reebok. Puma in turn was bought by
French luxury retailer PPR. 
• Athletic footwear production relies on large, capital inten-
sive factories that are relatively difficult to establish and
relocate.
• Yue Yuen performs a large portion of sports shoe produc-
tion for all the major sportswear brands.XXX And despite
the division of labor and legal boundaries between
brands and Yue Yuen, the manufacturing process is high-
ly integrated, and relatively stable. The stability in this
relationship opens the door for coordinated action on
“cash standard” matters like wages.
• Both Yue Yuen and its customers are highly profitable
companies.
In this highly consolidated and profitable sports shoe sec-
tor, joint action between companies like Yue Yuen and the
giant brands than dominate the market to raise wage lev-
els toward a living wage is not only desirable, but also
achievable. 
The fact that most of these sportswear brands are
Participating Companies in the US-based Fair Labor
Association (FLA) also means that joint action among buy-
ers and their suppliers to raise wage levels toward a living
wage is a practical possibility. The only things missing are
a commitment to pay a living wage and the political will to
achieve it. 
We will return to the issue of achieving a living wage in
Chapter VI and VII. 
XXX. While exact figures are hard to come by, analysts estimate that 25-30% of Nike’s shoes are manufactured by Yue Yuen, with adidas and Reebok
each sourcing approximately 15-20% of their shoes from Yue Yuen. All three brands account for at least 40% of Yue Yuen’s production. (Citigroup. Yue
Yuen – Shoes to Choose. 16 November 2004). Yue Yuen itself estimates that 54% of its sales are accounted for by five main customers, with their lar-
gest single customer accounting for 22% of sales (Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) Ltd. Annual Report, 2007. p.27).
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XXXI. Both centres – China especially – also produce hand-stitched balls, but it is not clear that they have the ability to offer lower prices than the
South Asian centres can. 
XXXII. For the purposes of this study, the researchers at the Centre for Education and Communication (CEC) and other Play Fair researchers spoke to a
range of stakeholders in Jalandhar: a total of seven manufacturers, sometimes with their managers, three contractors, two trade union leaders, and 11
workers in homes, stitching centres and factories. The majority of the seven manufacturers interviewed performed a mix of domestic and export pro-
duction, and while most of the export production was for brands in Europe or Australia, several had their own brands, which they were exporting pri-
marily to Eastern Europe as well as East and Southern Africa.
Unlike the massive Yue Yuen footwear factories document-
ed in the previous chapter, soccer ball production has tra-
ditionally been done by hand-stitchers, many of whom are
homeworkers, who stitch panels together and then send
them back to the factories for checking and packing.  
Advocacy on labour rights in the production of soccer balls
– and other inflatable balls – has focused primarily on the
city of Sialkot, Pakistan, and with good reason: that city
produces approximately 80% of the world's hand-stitched
balls.175
A flood of media attention to the issue of child labour in
Sialkot in the 1990s led to increased scrutiny of conditions
in Jalandhar, India176 – a much smaller centre for hand-
stitching of sports goods just across the border.177
In recent years, soccer ball production centres have also
emerged in China, Thailand, Vietnam and elsewhere. The
ability of these new centres to produce low-end, machine-
stitched balls at much lower cost than are available in
South Asia,XXXI and/or high-end “thermo-moulded” balls for
which South Asian manufacturers have not yet acquired
the necessary technology, have brought still greater uncer-
tainty to the future of the industry in India and Pakistan.178
Rather than revisiting the well-documented issue of child
labour in the soccer ball industry in Sialkot, this chapter
focuses instead on recent research conducted for Play Fair
2008 on working conditions in Jalandhar, India, and
emerging centres in China and Thailand. 
Research findings indicate that, like apparel and footwear
production, the structure of the industry has created an
environment in which trade unions are sidelined or
destroyed, wages and piece rates are often well below a
living wage, and workers are only able to survive by taking
on excessively long overtime hours and, in some cases, by
bringing work home to their families. 
Soccer ball production in Jalandhar, IndiaXXXII
According to industry reports, Jalandhar and the nearby
city of Meerut account for 75-80% of the balls produced in
India.179 In 2004, India’s exports of sporting goods reached
US$100 million, Forty-three percent of these exports were
in soccer balls.180
Industry structure
According to manufacturers, unions and workers inter-
viewed for this report, the current structure of the industry,
with a heavy reliance on home-based work, is a relatively
recent phenomenon. “The work was entirely factory and
stitching centre based [until] 30 years ago” said an official
with the Lal Janda Workers Union, himself a soccer ball
stitcher for the last 45 years. “Workers used to stitch in fac-
tories in large numbers. Work was also done in stitching
centres, each centre employing 10-30 workers.”181
As demand for leather balls dwindled, production shifted
from hand-cut leather panels with hand-perforated holes to
balls made of die-cut panels with perforations.182 The degree
of skill required to stitch together pre-cut, pre-perforated
synthetic panels was significantly lower, as were the stakes:
synthetic balls commanded lower prices from brands, and
could be manufactured in significantly less time. 
This switch to synthetic balls set the stage for the move to
a much more informal work force, which could be paid on
a piece rate basis, rather than receiving salaries that would
have to be paid even when there were no orders.183 It also
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made economic sense for production to be done off-site in
workers’ homes rather than in factories with strict quality
controls and higher operating costs. The involvement of
children in soccer ball production was therefore part of a
larger story of increasing informalization.
Factories
Most factories currently engaged in soccer ball production
in Jalandhar have few permanent employees beyond those
involved in production processes that must be performed
on-site (die-cutting the panels, screen-printing panels,
packing the balls, etc.). 
Even here, some former factory workers described being
employed by labour contractors who operated on the fac-
tory premises.184 One factory worker, who had been
employed in a permanent position in the lamination and
panel-cutting department for the last 15 years, noted that,
as far as he knew, no other permanent workers had been
hired since he began his job. 
According to the worker, all new employees were brought
in on short-term contracts, or through sub-contracts with
labour brokers.185 Where factories employed stitchers
directly, the employers acknowledged that, for the most
part, these workers were hired on fixed-term contracts and
paid on a piece rate basis.186
Workers interviewed described a factory environment that
is entirely male. Indeed, when Play Fair researchers visited
three soccer ball factories in Jalandhar, they found an
almost total absence of women workers. 
Women occupy a subordinate role in Jalandhar's soccer
ball industry, in terms of the type and quality of work they
are assigned. And, changes in how the industry is struc-
tured could exacerbate this problem. For example, in the
Sialkot experience, women's livelihoods became a casual-
ty of the policy to move from home-based production to
stitching centres. After the change, women's participation
in the industry dropped from 50% in 1997 to about 20%
just six years later.187
Stitching centres
The General Secretary of the Punjab Sports Goods Workers
Union told Play Fair researchers that “stitching centres are
nothing but the extended wing of the factories.” He
charged that the centres are set up to avoid the application
of labour laws that would promote access to benefits, dis-
pute resolution mechanisms, and security of tenure.188
In fact, a contractor who runs a stitching centre acknowl-
edged that the rent, electricity bill and other expenses
related to the space were paid by the company, while he
dealt only with the labour. However, the centre was regis-
tered in his name, thereby permitting the company to dis-
avow legal responsibility for the workers. The centre
employs 18 workers (16 men, two women) who produce
100 balls per day. They are paid by the piece, from INR36
to 39 (US$0.90-0.97) for a first quality ball and INR30
(US$0.75) for the cheaper balls.189
Contractors
Manufacturers also spoke about their relationship to con-
tractors. While one manufacturer, who produces for Regent,
Mitre and Dunlop encourages home-based stitchers to pick
up work directly from their premises, the majority utilize
between 18 and 30 contractors, who either send production
to homes, or operate stitching centres themselves. 
“Contractor” is a relatively flexible category. While some
earn a significant living operating stitching centres, for
example, there are those at the other end of the scale, who
rely on the commissions they receive for getting balls pro-
duced by home-based workers, and whose daily earnings
are roughly similar to those of stitchers. 
Play Fair researchers spoke to two contractors who engage
home-based stitchers. Both contractors were formerly
stitchers in the soccer ball industry; one lost his job in a
soccer ball factory after an industrial accident severed part
of his finger. Each contractor picks up 100 balls per day
and distributes them to a team of 20-30 home-based
workers, the vast majority of them women. The contractors'
income consists of the set commission that the factory
pays them, between INR2 and 2.50 (US$0.05-0.06) per
ball, depending on the quality.190
Trade unions
The combined impact of movement out of permanent, fac-
tory-based employment and of indirect production rela-
tionships was to cripple trade unions, and thereby elimi-
nate the need to negotiate with workers about wages and
working conditions. Workers – and even manufacturers –
described direct union-busting strategies including firing
or demoting union leaders and members; getting rid of
highly-unionized departments and contracting out that
work; and sidelining unions for the purpose of eliminating
collective bargaining.191
Wages and piece rates in Jalandhar
When manufacturers began engaging with contractors
about 20 years ago (rather than directly with home-based
workers), workers lost control over the negotiation of the
conditions of their employment, including earnings. As the
CITU representative stated, “The management association
started bypassing trade unions in rate negotiations.
Contractors became the main actors.”192 In a system in
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which contractors received a fixed commission per ball,
there was little incentive for them to bargain aggressively
during annual negotiations, and stagnation of piece rates
inevitably resulted. 
Contractors described how different factories pay different
rates for the same quality of ball. One contractor reported
that the rate varied from INR28 to 39 (US$0.70-0.97) for a
“first quality” ball, and INR14 to 16 (US$0.35-0.40) for a
cheap rubber ball. There is often more than one level of
sub-contracting, and in these cases, contractors further
down the chain will extract a commission before passing
the work along, thus eroding the piece rate further.193
Wages in factories
One factory-based worker with whom the Play Fair
researchers spoke was a stitcher on a fixed-term contract,
paid by the piece. While piece rates in the factory are sub-
stantially higher than those available to home-based work-
ers, especially given the elimination of the contractor's
commission (INR40 (US$1) for a first-quality soccer ball,
INR30 (US$0.75) for a low-end one), it is striking that
stitchers in factories must still provide the thread used for
stitching, at a cost of INR2 to 2.50 (US$0.05-0.06) per ball.
The worker said that he was able to complete a maximum
of 10 balls a day, depending on the type of ball.194 Another
factory worker, whose earnings are substantially over min-
imum wage, told researchers that he still has to take stitch-
ing work home to his family in order to make ends meet.195
Wages in stitching centres
Researchers interviewed two workers at stitching centres,
both of which were operated by contractors. Earnings and job
security were substantially lower than at factories. The piece
rates for soccer balls appeared to be between INR3 and 10
(US$0.07-0.10) lower, based on the quality of the ball.XXXIII As
one worker complained, “there is no guarantee of work tomor-
row and everything depends on the mercy of the contractor.” 
The workers interviewed described being unable to survive
on their earnings from the stitching centre work alone.
Both said they take stitching work home for their families
to do in order to supplement their household income.196
Wages for home-based workers
Six home-based workers were interviewed by the research
team; in each case, all or most of the other members of
their households were also involved in the stitching, with
each person producing about two to four balls a day.XXXIV
“There has not been any increase in the rate since last five
years,” explained a stitcher who picks up work directly from a
factory producing for Mitre, Gilbert and the soccer clubs Arsenal
and Manchester United. “We have to agree to whatever the
contractor pays to us, as we don’t have any other choice.” 
As might be expected, the rates paid to home-based work-
ers are even lower than those provided in stitching centres.
Workers described receiving INR30 - 35 (US$0.75-0.88) for
a three-ply, 32-panel ball, and between INR14 and 22
(US$0.35-0.55) for a ball made of two-ply rubber panels.197
Home-based workers also face a total lack of earning secu-
rity. During months when orders are low, households are
often plunged into debt to money lenders. 
Orders – and therefore earnings – fluctuate dramatically in
this industry. Two manufacturers referred specifically to
production increases of 30-50% when sporting events
such as the World Cup or the Olympics take place.198
“We have no savings so we have nothing left during emer-
gencies,” said a 50-year-old soccer ball stitcher. There are
also few if any safety nets available for homeworkers: sick-
ness or an accident can amount to a catastrophe. “I have
lost my wife’s gold, which I gave as security to a money-
lender and could not repay,” he said. “Once I even rented
my cooking gas cylinder to arrange some money for a
health emergency suffered by my wife. The situation is sim-
ilar for all of us. One of my friends even sold his blood to
get some extra money to meet an emergency.”199
XXXIII. There is no apparent standardization of what the terms “first quality” and “cheap quality” mean, and this is certainly one factor in the extreme
range of piece rates. 
XXXIV. The seven members of one household described being able to complete 15 rugby and seven soccer balls a day; another household, with eight
members, completes about 30 balls a day.
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Workers in Thailand.
SOME SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
JALANDHAR
Manufacturers should take steps to ensure
that the rates and conditions offered to work-
ers, through contractors, are fair and uniform.
Rates for balls should be posted outside facto-
ries. Manufacturers should offer the option for
workers to pick up soccer ball kits directly from
their premises, rather than from contractors. 
Brands must address violations of association-
al rights, especially the crushing of trade
unions. Brands and suppliers must ensure
prices keep pace with currency fluctuations
and inflation, and ensure that losses are not
passed on to workers through cuts in the
piece-rate. Interventions must be attentive to
the vulnerability of women workers. 
Brands must promote equality of treatment for
all workers engaged in substantially similar
work whether employed in factories, stitching
centers or home-based facilities, including in
wages and benefits.
Soccer ball production in China
China’s ability to make the technological adaptation to
machine stitching faster, more efficient and on a larger scale
than other ball-producing countries has resulted in its quick
growth within the soccer ball producing market.200 Currently,
China’s soccer ball producers manufacture primarily promo-
tional balls. While promotional balls represent a large por-
tion of world soccer ball production, they do not have the
industry cachet or high piece rates associated with match-
quality balls. Many industry insiders speculate that it will not
be long until match-quality balls are also machine-made,
however, which puts China in a position to take over an even
larger portion of world soccer-ball production.201
Between October and December 2007, Play Fair
researchers investigated conditions at two typical soccer
ball factories in the Pearl River Delta region: Joyful Long
Sports Manufactory and Kuan Ho Sporting Goods.XXXV
Joyful Long manufactures a variety of sports balls and
equipment for adidas,202 Nike, Umbro, Fila, Miter, Lotto,
Puma, Diadora, Frankin, Wilson, Everlast, and Domyos.203
The company has four buildings producing different lines,
and there may be some distinction between lines produc-
ing for different companies. Kuan Ho, which claims to be
the largest ball-manufacturing company in China, produc-
ing 2 millions balls a month,204 produces for adidas, Lotto,
Spalding, Wilson, Mikasa, Mizuno, Rawlings, and Baden.205
Wages and working hours
At Joyful Long factory, most production workers work seven
days per week. “It is ridiculous that there is not even one
rest day in a whole month!” one worker said. “Physically we
are so tired, but psychologically we are also exhausted. We
want time to take rest and have fun.” 
“When we are so exhausted,” the worker said, “we can only
get some rest by choosing to be absent. However, accord-
ing to the factory rules, if we’re absent for three consecu-
tive days we will be fined. So even if we are tired, we usu-
ally choose to endure.” 
While a “standard” workday is eight hours, overtime work
is extremely common at Joyful Long. During the peak pro-
duction season, workers put in 232 hours of overtime per
month – six times the legal limit.206
Despite the massive number of hours worked at the Joyful
Long factory – often in the range of 330 hours a month –
workers were receiving on average RMB800-1,000
(US$114-142) per month, an estimated 54% of the legal
minimum wage. In addition, workers reported that wage
payments are regularly delayed by forty days, also in viola-
tion of national law.  
Workers at Kuan Ho fare somewhat better: workers work six
days a week and put in an average of 80 overtime hours
each month. While these hours are well above the legal
limits, they are, by many workers’ accounts, among the
best in the industry in the Pearl River Delta.207
Wages at Kuan Ho are also better than at Joyful Long, averaging
RMB1,000 - 1,500 (US$142-213) per month for approximately
260 hours work. Wages are also paid on a regular basis. 
However, at neither factory does overtime compensation
comply with the law.  
XXXV. Play Fair researchers interviewed seven women and five men at Kuan Ho, aged between 21 and 30.  At Joyful Long, researchers interviewed ten
men and five women, the majority under 30 years old. 
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“I find I could earn only 2-3 yuan an hour [at Joyful Long]”
one worker told us. The minimum monthly wage in
Dongguan translates into approximately RMB4.20 an hour
(US$0.60). “For me, the most annoying thing is that there
is no overtime premium in this factory. Even if I work in the
weekends, I can get only the normal wage rate.” 
Like the Yue Yuen factories studied in the last chapter, both
of these factories use a mixture of time and piece rates to
arrive at a worker’s total compensation. However, by law
piece rates must, at minimum, meet minimum wage and
overtime compensation requirements for hours worked. At
Kuan Ho, the factory ensures that piece rate workers
receive, at minimum, the monthly minimum wage even if
the piece rate falls below that amount. However, like Joyful
Long, the factory does not pay the overtime premiums
required by law.XXXVI 
Occupational Health and Safety
Similar to Play Fair’s findings at Yue Yuen factories in the
same region, workers reported health and safety hazards
related to the emphasis on high work productivity. 
At both Joyful Long and Kuan Ho, workers interviewed were
seriously concerned about the possible short- and long-
term health effects of working with various chemicals in
departments like silk-screening, “laminating” (in which the
outer layer of the ball is adhered to the inner layer), and in
departments producing plastic balls. Most workers told
Play Fair researchers they were not even aware of what
substances they are in contact with on a daily basis.
Workers reported skin allergies and breathing discomfort. 
And while both factories provide some rudimentary protec-
tive equipment, the use of the equipment slows down pro-
duction and thereby the quantity of production. Some
workers at Joyful Long, particularly in silk-screening depart-
ments, report that they would be unable to meet the daily
production quota set by the factory if they were to wear
their safety equipment at all times.208
Workers at Joyful Long are not covered by legally-required
insurance programs including worker injury compensation,
social insurance and maternity leave. While they can
attend company medical clinics, the cost of the visit and
any medications prescribed are deducted from their
wages. 
Freedom of association
Workers interviewed said there is no trade union activity at
either factory. Most workers were not aware of their rights
concerning trade union representation. 
While workers can air grievances with supervisors, there is
no formal grievance process.  Both factories have a worker
committee meant to identify and deal with issues that
arise, but neither committee, at Joyful Long or at Kuan Ho,
is particularly active or effective. At Joyful Long, committee
members are appointed by management. Workers report
that the committee exists primarily to appease auditors. 
Misleading and lying to brand auditors
Workers interviewed described lying to brand auditors as
“common practice.” Workers confirmed that representa-
tives of major brands are sent to the factory every month to
conduct on-site inspections.
At Joyful Long, workers described how management per-
sonnel produce a false wage sheet for the auditors, which
inaccurately reflects higher compensation rates than are
actually paid to its workers. They also reported being pres-
sured to lie to auditors about working hours and wages. 
“I signed two wage record sheets when I received my
September wages on the 10th of November,” one worker
told Play Fair researchers. “One wage record sheet stated
that I received RMB400 [US$57], which reflected the reali-
ty. The other wage record sheet stated that I received
RMB900 [US$128]. That was for the brand auditors.”209
Additionally, workers reported that they are coached into
giving false answers to the queries of the auditors in order
to ensure that the factory passes inspection. Workers who
comply and lie to inspectors are given a RMB30 to 60
(US$0.75-1.50) bonus; workers who tell the truth will be
fined or fired.210
XXXVI. Article 44 of the Chinese Labour Law requires employers to pay 150% of the regular compensation rate for overtime work on weekdays, 200%
for Saturday and Sunday, and 300% for statutory holidays.
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Workers in Thailand.
Soccer ball production in Thailand
Thailand’s profile in soccer ball production was raised in
2006 when adidas sourced technologically advanced balls
from Thailand for the official 2006 World Cup games.211
These balls were produced by Molten Thailand, a
Japanese-owned sports ball company.212
The Impact of Machine-Fusing Technology
The official 2006 World Cup game balls, which adidas
named “Teamgeist,” were produced using a new technolo-
gy: thermal bonding of ball panels by machines, rather
than by stitching.213 Until recently, soccer balls were exclu-
sively hand-stitched or machine-stitched.214
The 2006 World Cup was the first important soccer tourna-
ment to use balls that were not hand-stitched.215 To some
industry insiders, this shift indicated that the industry would
be moving away from the use of hand-stitched balls in profes-
sional tournaments. Nearly two years later, however, it seems
it is not yet clear whether the industry will move exclusively to
thermally-bonded balls. If this change does occur, it would
provide Thailand with a large competitive advantage over
Pakistan and India, both of which have remained focused on
hand-stitching and lack operating machine-fusing technology,
as well as over China, which produces lower-end machine-
stitched and hand-stitched balls.XXXVII
Wages, working conditions, and freedom of association
In 2006 the Thai Labour Campaign (TLC) released a report
on labour conditions in two factories that produce soccer
balls in the eastern seaboard industrial zone.216 The Life of
Football Factory Workers in Thailand details problems with
wages and freedom of association in both Molten Thailand,
which produced the adidas Teamgeist balls, and in Mikasa
Industries, which produces soccer balls for its own brand.
The TLC report asserted that Molten provided substantially
different wages and benefits for regular and sub-contract-
ed workers. While senior workers employed directly by
Molten were paid a salary that met their basic monthly
needs (estimated at between THB7,310 and 8,680 a
month by TLC), new workers received a basic wage of
THB4,500  (US$144). Sub-contracted workers were the
worst off, receiving only the minimum wage, without access
to monthly incentives and other bonuses. They were also
required to pay out of pocket for their uniforms. Adidas
reports that the practice was discontinued after it was
exposed by TLC.217
Responding to the 2006 report, adidas confirmed the
wages cited by TLC, but argued that the factory is comply-
ing with the minimum wages set by the government. TLC
responded that because the minimum wage does not meet
workers’ basic needs, workers are forced to rely on long
overtime hours to get by.218
At the time the report was written, there was a two-year old
union at Mikasa, which TLC found had contributed to work-
ers achieving higher wages, subsidies, and other bene-
fits.iv Since that time, however, workers report that the
union has been eliminated as a result of continual harass-
ment of union leadership and members, including legal
action aimed at dismissing the union president (later with-
drawn).220 When three members of the union committee
protested against the harassment of union members, they
were sued by the factory for defamation, as was TLC.XXVIII
Waraporn Rakthai, the union’s president, was reassigned
to work alone in a restricted area for two years.221 “I am
always alone,” she said in April 2007. “Not a single worker
or any of the union’s members dares to talk with me either
in the workplace or in the canteen. Everyone is afraid they
will be in trouble if they talk to me.”
Mikasa claimed that “she was merely assigned to research
and development work that must be kept confidential,
hence the screen and the sign ‘No entry without permis-
sion.’”222 Given its antagonistic attitude toward the union
president, it strains credulity that the factory would decide
to assign her to carry out confidential research and devel-
opment work.  
“I keep fighting, no matter how sorry I feel deep in my
heart,” Rakthai said. “I want to tell other workers that there
is no shame to be fighting alone, and people will praise us
for fighting on.” Rakthai was finally dismissed in February
2008.223 By that point the Mikasa union had completely dis-
solved: most of the union leadership and membership
eventually resigned due to the various pressures exerted
on them, and the rest were dismissed.  
“I feel so sad to have to leave Waraporn alone in the
union,” the former union Vice President told our
researchers. “But I have no other choice. With economic
pressures and no overtime money for over a year, I had to
decide to leave Mikasa.”
In January, 2007, the Thai National Human Rights
Commission ruled that Mikasa Industries had intervened in
and suppressed the union, acted to suppress the union
president, violated Thai labour law and the UN Declaration
of Human Rights.224 However, the Commission’s findings
are not legally binding on the company.      
XXXVII. Note that the Pakistan Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority has announced that it is supporting the creation of a new Sports
Industries Development Centre (SIDC), which will introduce thermo-bonded ball technology in Sialkot. Pakistan is currently not in a position to pro-
duce thermo-moulded balls, however.  See Associated Press of Pakistan, “Smeda plans to modernize sports goods industry,” The Post, 25 February
2008.
XXXVIII. The legal actions were finally withdrawn by management earlier this year. 
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The verdict is in. Labour rights advocates, leading sports-
wear brands and multi-stakeholder initiatives have all con-
cluded that individual factory auditing may be identifying
problems, but it’s not fixing them. 
Having investigated factory audit results from over 800
Nike supply factories in 31 countries over seven years, for
example, academics Richard Locke, Fei Qin and Alberto
Brause concluded that “despite substantial efforts and
investments by Nike and its staff to improve working con-
ditions among its suppliers, monitoring alone appears to
have produced only limited results.”225
That’s not news to the thousands of workers who continue to
face sweatshop conditions in sportswear supply chains despite
over a decade’s worth of efforts to change the industry. 
That’s no reason to despair, however. Changes are possi-
ble. Or, as adidas likes to say, “Impossible is nothing!” 
But real change will require a different approach that takes
into account root causes – including structural factors –
that make labour rights abuses more likely to occur and
reoccur. It will also require increased, ongoing collabora-
tion by all players in the industry to overcome these struc-
tural impediments to progress.
In 2004, Play Fair presented the industry with a
Programme of Work designed to facilitate real changes in
time for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. We remain dis-
appointed that the industry, on the whole, did not live up
the challenge. 
Now, on the eve of the Beijng Olympics, we return in detail
to four focus areas related to the Programme of Work
where we believe real changes can be made that will open
up the industry to sustainable improvements on labour
rights. To seriously address the lack of freedom of associa-
tion and the right to bargain collectively; precarious
employment; and the impacts of factory closures; and to
raise wages and other compensation to a level that meets
workers’ basic needs, sportswear companies will need to
take a series of concrete, measurable actions in close col-
laboration with multi-stakeholder initiatives, trade unions,
non-governmental organizations, and governments.   
Many of these steps have been tried to a limited extent by
sportswear companies and others. By building on these
precedents, we can make substantial improvements in
working conditions in the industry by the next Olympic
Games in Vancouver in 2010, and in London in 2012. 
1. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING
If the industry is to achieve sustainable improvements in
labour practices and working conditions in its manufactur-
ing facilities, it is critical that brands in shared factories
respond swiftly and effectively to reports of violations of
freedom of association and collective bargaining such as
those described in Chapter III. 
In recent years there have been notable examples of col-
laborative action to win the reinstatement of workers fired
for attempting to organize and/or bargain collectively:
• At the Star factory in Honduras, where 55 union members
were dismissed shortly after registering their union in
November 2007, a combination of worker protests, an
international solidarity campaign, and the intervention of
one of the brand buyers, Nike, was successful in redress-
ing what could have been yet another denial of workers’
rights. On December 10, an agreement to reinstate the
workers and to engage in constructive dialogue to
resolve outstanding issues was signed by representatives
of the US-based owner, the workers, the Unitary
Federation of Honduran Workers (FUTH), and the Unitary
Confederation of Honduran Workers (CUTH).
• At Russell Athletic’s Jerzees Choloma factory in Honduras,
Russell Athletic agreed to reinstate workers fired in 2007
for union organizing, with back pay, after intervention by
the US-based Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) and the
Fair Labor Association (FLA), and cooperated with the
union on an outreach program to dismissed workers.226
• After a WRC investigation of violations of workers’ associ-
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ational rights at the Thai Garment Export facility, manage-
ment agreed to reinstate the six union members dis-
missed in December 2006. 
• At the request of a Thai NGO, the Center for Labour
Information Service and Training (CLIST), Nike, and the
Fair Labor Association intervened in a dispute at the MSP
Sportswear factory and played a positive role in facilitat-
ing re-instatement of fired union leaders. In addition,
they negotiated “terms of engagement” that identified a
neutral third party to mediate any future disputes.
These efforts by brand buyers and other stakeholders to
hold factories accountable for violations of the right to
organize are welcomed. There have also been efforts, such
as the Fair Labor Association’s Central America Project, to
tackle blacklisting of union members at a country or region-
al level through promotion of management training and
less discriminatory hiring procedures. 
However, the continued pattern of abuses at sportswear
factories suggests that more proactive and positive meas-
ures are needed to ensure that these abuses do not hap-
pen in the first place and that chronic anti-union behaviour
on the part of management is no longer permitted.  The
industry must take steps to create a positive attitude
toward trade unions and their organizing activities and a
positive climate in which workers are free to exercise their
associational rights, rather than simply responding to
crises after the fact. 
Taking the initiative
As a first step, the industry should take note of the steps
taken by Russell Athletic at the Jerzees Choloma factory as
part of the resolution of the dispute, above. Russell agreed
to issue a notice to workers at all of its facilities pledging to
respect workers’ rights in the areas of freedom of associa-
tion and collective bargaining.227
A RIGHT TO ORGANIZE GUARANTEE (MODELED
AFTER RUSSELL ATHLETIC’S STATEMENT)
“Company name respects the right of workers
to form or affiliate to organizations of their
choice, including trade unions, and to negotiate
a collective bargaining agreement. Company
name respects the right of its workers to freely
associate, to organize, and to negotiate collec-
tive agreements, and will not interfere in any
way in these worker activities. Company name
will not intervene in workers’ decisions to
become members of an organization, or in their
participation in any organization. Company
employees will not be subject to any discrimina-
tion or disciplinary or punitive action for exer-
cising their associational and collective bar-
gaining rights. Any supervisor or manager who
fails to adhere to this policy will be disciplined.
Company name guarantees that the representa-
tives of said organizations can have access to
its employees. Further, company name will
implement each agreement that it makes with
workers’ organizations.
Other sportswear manufacturers should issue a similar
“Right to Organize Guarantee” to workers in their manufac-
turing facilities globally (see box). Brands and retailers, for
their part, should require their suppliers to issue a
Guarantee, and multi-stakeholder initiatives active in the
sector should verify that the statements have been ade-
quately communicated to workers.
Further, in order to ensure that workers have access to oppor-
tunities to be represented by trade unions of their free choice
where they choose to do so, buyers and suppliers should
require the signing of union access agreements between fac-
tory management and local unions in the sector.XXXIX
Worker training
As a second step, sportswear brands should, in collabora-
tion with trade union organizations and credible labour
rights NGOs, facilitate independent education and training
for workers and management personnel concerning free-
dom of association and collective bargaining. 
Again, the good news is that there have already been
efforts in this area that we can learn from and build on.
Worker trainings on their rights have been undertaken by
major sportswear brands, suppliers and MSIs, alongside
management training on their responsibilities. 
XXXIX. An example of an access agreement signed between jeans giant Nien Hsing and the Lesotho Clothing and Allied Workers Union can be found
in: Trade Union Research Project and the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO). A Call to Action: Organizing Garment Workers in
Southern Africa. Clean Clothes Campaign, 2003. pp27-29, available at http://www.cleanclothes.nl/ftp/GarmentWorkersSA.pdf
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More and more service provider companies, including those
from the auditing profession, now claim to provide training
programs. The feedback we receive from workers on these
efforts, however, does not inspire confidence. While China’s
restrictions on civil society organizations may make it diffi-
cult to find independent credible labour rights groups to
engage with when developing worker training, such groups
do exist. They believe that worker training, if it has relevant
content, practice, and goals, can make an important contri-
bution to improving labour rights in Mainland China.
They point out, rightly, that training is a means to an end,
rather than an end in and of itself. The objective should be
to support genuine labour protection through improved
worker participation and a mature system of industrial rela-
tions. Therefore, it is important to evaluate what kinds of
trainings are most useful in promoting worker participation
and mature industrial relations, and which are not. 
Just as efforts to “impose” remediation on a factory are less
successful than collaborative efforts (as sportswear buyers
constantly remind us), worker training programs are much
more successful when there is collaboration with local
management and trade union organizations. Although
many programs are not initiated by workers, they should
respond to workers actual needs and seek to increase their
active participation in the program as it progresses. 
Before embarking on worker training programs, sportswear
brands, multi-stakeholder initiatives and manufacturers
should, in collaboration with knowledgeable unions, NGOs
and training providers, develop the means to assess the
impacts of training on workers and management, as well as
the means to report to stakeholders on those results in a
transparent way.
Sourcing and buying practices
As we saw in Chapter III, efforts by workers to organize
trade unions are often frustrated by the very real fear that
buyers will cut back on orders or relocate orders altogeth-
er once a trade union is established. 
Although some brands have taken the step of introducing
“balanced scorecards,” which attempt to integrate labour
standards performance alongside more traditional evalua-
tions of current and potential suppliers, these measures
tend to view the presence of unions in a factory as a neu-
tral rather than a positive factor that facilitates worker input
and participation and therefore should be rewarded with
substantial preference when choosing or maintaining
orders with a supplier. 
Steps by buyers towards a more positive climate for free-
dom of association should include:
• Preferential placement of orders in unionized factories;
• Long-term, stable supply contracts with unionized facto-
ries; and
• A measurable premium in unit prices for factories with
Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs).
In Chapter III we noted that some US businesses lobbied
against worker protections in China’s new labour contract
law, while others publicly disassociated themselves from
those efforts. Buyers and suppliers should take a positive,
public position in support of the right of workers to free-
dom of association and to bargain collectively, and convey
that position to governments that continue to restrict this
fundamental worker right. 
In line with Play Fair 2008’s recommendations, Nike has
recently called on governments to “recognize and respect
the principles embodied in ILO Conventions 87 and 98
regarding freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing.”228 Other sportswear brands should take a similar posi-
tion, including calling on all countries to formally ratify
those Conventions. 
Reporting
Lastly, in order to assess the effectiveness of the above
efforts, the sportswear industry must measure and report
on the presence of unions and collective bargaining agree-
ments in their supply chains, and the (aggregated) per-
centage of their own production in those factories.XL Buyers
and suppliers should also measure and report to stake-
holders the percentage of production in jurisdictions
where freedom of association is legally restricted, with a
view to preventing further expansion of production in areas
where the industry’s own codes of conduct cannot be
effectively implemented.XLI
2. PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT
Although there has been a growing tendency in the sports-
wear industry to use short-term employment contracts and
dispatched or casual labour to deal with the instability in
order timelines and volumes, there have also been notable
efforts to reverse this untenable situation at both a factory
level and at the public policy level. 
At the PCCS Garment factory in Cambodia that we discussed
on page 26, for example, the rise in use of short-term con-
tract labour was reversed by factory management working
with adidas and the Worker Rights Consortium. In 2007, a
majority of short-term contract workers were moved to per-
XL. This measure is now a part of the Global Reporting Initiative’s G3 reporting Guidelines (measure AF29).
XLI. Adidas provided such an analysis to Oxfam in 2005, showing that approximately 52% of its production occurs in Asia-Pacific countries that do
not give legal force to workers freedom of association and collective bargaining, and that this amount had grown by 3% between 2002 and 2004
(see Connor, Tim and Kelly Dent. Offside! Labour rights and sportswear production in Asia. Oxfam International, 2006, p77)
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manent contracts with the factory. Where shorter-term con-
tracts are to be used, it will only be in accordance with a
clearly defined plan justifying their use.229 Adidas also
reports efforts to reduce the use of contract labour at Molten
Thailand (see page 46).
The steps taken by PCCS Garment, in collaboration with
adidas, should be emulated by other sportswear buyers
and suppliers wherever the excessive use of precarious
employment has become common in their supply chains.
As noted on page 27, legal restrictions on the abuse of
short-term labour contracts have been enacted in some
countries, and in China some sportswear companies sup-
ported, rather than opposed, these changes. Using the
recent improvements to China’s labour law as an example,
sportswear companies should take a positive, public posi-
tion in support of legal restrictions on the abuse of short-
term contract labour and dispatched labour schemes. 
However, because of the frequent gap between regulation
and effective enforcement, sportswear brands, retailers
and manufacturers also need to ensure that the factories
producing their goods abide by these legal restrictions
where they exist, and discourage the abuse of short-term
contracts where the law is still silent on the issue. 
The abuse of short-term contracts and dispatched labour
schemes as a means of avoiding social security and other
obligations due to workers should be expressly prohibited
in company and MSI codes of conduct. 
Adidas, for example, has indicated that it will insist on per-
manent status for workers that are hired on short-term con-
tracts “to avoid legal responsibilities,”230 which is a step in
the right direction, and that as a matter of policy adidas
“actively discourage[s] the use of temporary or contract
labour in the supply chain.”231 Unfortunately, most sports-
wear companies and some MSI codes of conduct are silent
on the issue, although the abuse of short-term contracts
could be seen in many cases as a violation of other code
components like freedom of association or discrimination.XLII
More importantly, however, the industry must come to
terms with the instability in orders that encourages facto-
ries to seek an increasingly flexible workforce. Buyers must
make efforts to adjust their purchasing practices to:
• Develop long-term, stable supply contracts with supply
factories;
• Ensure that payment schedules are set out in all supply
contracts and that payments are made on time; 
• Wherever possible, space out orders over the year to
reduce seasonal fluctuations;
• Establish an optimum notice time for factories concern-
ing any changes in existing orders or placement of orders
so that the factory is able to adjust production according-
ly without violating hours of work standards or requiring
the use of short-term contracts and/or subcontracting;
and
• If necessary, adjust order deadlines.
3. FACTORY CLOSURES
It would be disingenuous to talk about factory closures as
being “responsible” or “good” closures. In the end, even if
all legal obligations have been met, workers still lose their
jobs and their community as a whole suffers the conse-
quences. 
However, given the reality described earlier – that in most
factory closures, workers are cheated out of severance pay,
back wages, social security benefits and/or other legal
entitlements – there are some immediate demands that
must be made of sportswear companies to at least reduce
the negative impacts of factory closures. 
When Canadian T-shirt manufacturer Gildan Activewear
announced the closure of two of its factories in the State of
Coahuila in northern Mexico in March 2007, the company
initiated a series of discussions with the local labour rights
organization SEDEPAC and Canada’s Maquila Solidarity
Network on compensation and assistance for the 1,300
workers who would be left jobless. Positive outcomes of
the company’s willingness to engage in constructive dia-
logue included one-year health insurance coverage for
unemployed former workers, severance pay beyond legal
entitlements in lieu of notice, and a financial contribution
to a government job retraining program for former Gildan
workers.
When Yupoong announced the closure of the BJ&B factory
in the Dominican Republic (see page 29), intervention by
brand buyers, the WRC and the International Textile,
Garment and Leather Workers Federation encouraged
negotiation with the local union on an agreement provid-
ing for three months of severance over and above the legal
entitlement and a sum of 200,000 pesos (US$6,100) for
the union and its federation for organizing and education-
al programs. 
As a general rule, negotiation with an existing trade union
to develop alternatives to closure or, at minimum, the
terms of closure, should be considered an obligation.
However, it is even more critical that as brands, retailers
and international manufacturers restructure their supply
chains and manufacturing networks, they take steps to
minimize the potential for disastrous factory closures. 
XLII. A clause to this effect is included in the SA8000, Ethical Trading Initiative, and Fair Wear Foundation codes of conduct.
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There have been positive efforts to develop a catalogue of
best practices, outlining a series of concrete steps buyers,
suppliers, governments and others should take to minimize
the possibility of closures and reduce the negative impacts
where they cannot be avoided. These guidance documents
emphasize the need for collaborative efforts among buyers
and with suppliers, trade union organizations and NGOs
throughout the sourcing and manufacturing cycle. 
• The MFA ForumXLIII has published a Collaborative
Framework that includes guidelines for buyers, manufac-
turers, governments, international institutions, and trade
unions and NGOs on their responsibilities during the
post-quota transition. The Collaborative Framework,
which includes guidelines on responsibilities of buyers
and manufacturers prior to and during factory closures
and exits, is available at: http://www.mfa-
forum.net/docs/Collaborative.pdf 
• The Clean Clothes Campaign has issued an e-bulletin on
Closures entitled Expectations in Relation to Factory
Closures and Mass-Dismissals, available at:
w w w.c l ea n c l o t h e s . o r g / f t p / 0 7 - 0 9 _ CCC _ E- b u l -
letin_Closures_and_Mass_dismissals.pdf
• The Maquila Solidarity Network has published a set of
demands related to factory closures entitled What Do
Labour Rights Groups Expect from Retailers,
Manufacturers and Government?, available at:
www.maquilasolidarity.org/issues/ca/closures
The key theme in all three documents is that closures are
not inevitable, nor is it acceptable that workers do not
receive their legal due when closures do happen. By taking
responsibility throughout the sourcing and manufacturing
cycle, buyers and suppliers can lessen both the frequency
and negative impacts of factory closures.
Some of these measures include:
• Where feasible, maintain current country supply base
and contain consolidation in-country;  
• Consider all possible ways to avert retrenchment/closure,
with the full involvement of, and negotiation with, worker
representatives where they exist;
• Where restructuring takes place, adopt a planned
approach and work with the supplier concerned and with
other buyers to mitigate the negative impacts of a deci-
sion to withdraw from or close a factory; 
• Monitor supplier adherence to regular and timely pay-
ment of wages and legally required benefits (e.g. social
security/pension payments) to appropriate the
party(ies); and
• Overseeing, on an on-going basis, that sufficient
resources are available to meet all employee liabilities in
the event of downsizing or closure.
The sportswear industry and multi-stakeholder initiatives
active in the sector should develop and adopt formal poli-
cies and procedures to give effect to the guidelines and
proposals contained in the Collaborative Framework, as
well as the CCC and MSN documents, and communicate
these policies publicly.
The industry also needs to better measure and report on its
sourcing practices. For example, buyers should report pub-
licly on the average length of relationship with supply fac-
tories, as well as more detailed statistics on the number of
factories with which the company has worked for various
incremental numbers of years (e.g. 1, 3, 5, or more years)
and where they are located. 
Transparent reporting on company policies concerning
transitions and closures would assist in developing collab-
orative efforts with other buyers and stakeholders, as well
as encouraging better practice by other companies in the
industry. Such reporting should include policies for suppli-
er/vendor selection, and/or termination, including new
source approval process, linking of supplier labour rights
performance with sourcing decisions, and strategies for
managing impact of exiting factories.XLIV
4. LIVING WAGES
In Chapter III we detailed the structural impediments to
achieving a living wage in any one country as long as the
sportswear industry remains footloose. Any substantial
improvements in wages or working conditions that might
affect profits made by buyers or prices paid to suppliers
(so-called “cash standards”) have remained out of bounds
for most corporate social responsibility programs. Instead,
brands, retailers and multi-stakeholder initiatives like the
Fair Labor Association have focused on productivity
improvements, which, they believe, open the door for wage
increases without impacting on price. 
Unfortunately, as we saw in Chapter IV, a focus on
increased productivity at Yue Yuen factories resulted in
higher work stress and lower pay for workers who were no
longer able to earn production bonuses. The data from Yue
Yuen factories also illustrated the danger of relying solely
on local minimum wage-setting mechanisms, since facto-
ries can just as easily eliminate other parts of the overall
compensation package to undermine the positive effects
of a rise in the minimum wage.
XLIII. The MFA Forum brings together retailers and brands, trade unions, NGOs, and national and multilateral public institutions to identify and pro-
mote collaborative strategies to support vulnerable national garment industries and greater respect for workers’ rights in the post-quota period. For
more information, visit: http://www.mfa-forum.net/
XLIV. For further recommendations on transparent reporting, see the Maquila Solidarity Network’s December 2007 Codes Memo “"The Next genera-
tion of CSR reporting: will better reporting result in better working conditions?", available at: www.maquilasolidarity.org/en/node/749
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We also noted that efforts to increase wages that rely sole-
ly on one actor are unlikely to be effective. Brands and
retailers cannot simply increase prices paid without some
mechanism to ensure that increased margins go to worker
wages. As well, factory owners will not raise wages without
some assurance that buyers will not source production
elsewhere when they must assume extra costs. And trade
unions, where they exist, cannot negotiate higher wages if
the factory is unduly constrained by competitive pressures.
All of these constraints on wages are a product of a partic-
ular business model favoured by the sportswear industry. A
challenge for the industry in the years ahead is to alter this
unsustainable model so that payment of a living wage
becomes possible. 
We know that won’t happen overnight. However, there are a
number of steps the industry can and should take now to work
towards delivering worker wages and other compensation that
falls within the range of general living wage estimates for the
regions where sportswear is being manufactured.
Measuring the living wage
As noted above, debates over the exact measurement of a
living wage have not produced definitive action towards
achieving those levels. Instead, they have generated fur-
ther debate over the exact methodologies used to deliver
a living wage figure, which does nothing to improve actual
practice in the industry. 
A more promising approach to determining wage levels in
a particular local context is the use of “wage ladders” pio-
neered in the Jo-In projectXLV in Turkey, which sets aside the
question of how best to measure a living wage and focus-
es instead on how to improve wages by stages to achieve
a living wage over time.
In its application in the Turkey project, the wage ladder
approach began with an assessment of current wage levels
in a particular local context. The project participants then
identified a progressive series of steps from the legal min-
imum wage, to the prevailing industry wage, to negotiated
wage, to the living wage standards of different MSIs, and
up to a living wage as defined by local trade unions.232
Once a “wage ladder” has been developed for a particular
country or region, the focus can turn to “effective strategies
for improving wage levels (e.g. increasing the prices paid,
improving productivity, improving management systems,
or applying cost-sharing schemes).”233
As a first step towards improving wages for sportswear
workers, buyers, suppliers, trade unions and NGOs should
collaborate to develop wage ladders – including living
wage estimates – for countries or regions in which sports-
wear production is taking place. Wage ladders will need to
be adjusted regularly to account for changes in the con-
sumer price indices for the area so that it’s also possible to
determine whether workers wages are keeping pace with
inflation. 
Moving up the ladder
How sportswear companies ensure that wage increases
are achieved in specific manufacturing facilities will
depend on a number of factors. Buyers, for example, will
have different relationships with different factories based
on the quantity of orders and the length of relationship
with the factory. Some factories have trade unions present,
which increases the ability of workers to capture any high-
er margins achieved through productivity gains and/or
increased prices. In short, one size does not fit all.
Where trade unions are present, buyers should assist their
efforts to achieve wage increases through collective bar-
gaining by sharing (on a confidential basis) data on unit
prices paid to the supplier. General management training
and support for collective bargaining with suppliers should
also assist in the development of mature industrial rela-
tions at sportswear factories, including collective bargain-
ing concerning wages.
On an individual basis, buyers can also commit to giving
preference in sourcing to suppliers and factories that meet
a higher standard on wages, along the wage ladder for
each region, which should help develop incentives for sup-
pliers to meet higher standards.
Studying prices and productivity
Improvements in productivity that do not also increase the
pace of work, working hours, health and safety hazards,
and physical exertion expected of workers are generally
welcomed. However, the evidence that productivity gains,
on their own, are sufficient to increase wages at the facto-
ry level is fairly slim. 
Before the industry puts all its eggs into the productivity
basket, companies should jointly – perhaps through multi-
stakeholder initiatives, such as the FLA, Ethical Trading
Initiative (ETI), Social Accountability International (SAI)
and/or the FairWear Foundation (FWF) – commission one
or more independent studies of lean production methods
to determine whether they can reliably deliver increases in
wages without negatively impacting workers. 
XLV. The Joint Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Worker Rights (Jo-In) was a project carried out in Turkey between 2003 and 2007 by six multi-
stakeholder initiatives and labour rights organizations to discern good practice and provide guidance that will inform the global effort of achieving
improved working conditions, as well as producing real, positive outcomes in Turkey.
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Similarly, the question of whether prices paid by buyers to
suppliers are sufficient to allow suppliers to meet labour
standards in company and MSI codes of conduct (including
living wage standards) needs further study. 
The price question is closely linked to the question of pro-
ductivity. If suppliers are more productive, buyers argue,
they can pay higher wages without increasing prices.
Suppliers, on the other hand, argue that prices are too low
to allow wage increases even with improvements in pro-
ductivity. 
Buyers and suppliers should collaborate in commissioning
an independent study on prices paid to suppliers, to which
they would provide (on a confidential basis) pricing data
and other information that would assist in determining
whether prices paid to suppliers are sufficient to allow fac-
tory management to comply with company and MSI codes
of conduct and to provide for sufficient wages and other
compensation that meet basic needs.
Collaborative efforts
One of the arguments used against a company’s adopting
living wage standards is that an individual buyer does not
have the ability to ensure improvements in wages in a facto-
ry producing for a number of buyers. The influence of a sin-
gle buyer is limited in such cases, companies argue, since
their best efforts may not be matched by other buyers.
For this very reason, buyers must collaborate to improve
wages. 
Collaboration is now accepted by buyers that share audit
information (to reduce the number of audits at any one fac-
tory), or by buyers that collaborate through the Fair Labor
Association or other MSIs to implement management train-
ing, for example.XLVI As well, Nike has publicly committed to
“lead multi-brand collaboration on compliance issues in 30
percent of [its] supply chain” by 2011.234
Buyers could begin to implement a living wage standard by
identifying supply factories in which they, individually
and/or collectively, account for at least 75% of production.235
Although the 75% figure is arbitrary, buyers must at least
account for a substantial majority of production. It’s also
important that the brands present in the factory have a long-
standing business relationship with the supplier and the fac-
tory, which will allow for more sustainable improvements
and cooperation from the supplier and factory management.
Yue Yuen, for example, has a long-term commercial relation-
ship with a number of major brand buyers. 
Using the wage ladder as a guideline, buyers could commit
to a target for wages that substantially increases workers’
wages and other compensation over time. Then, as individ-
ual buyers, each company would negotiate with the suppli-
er on measures needed to meet the targets, proportional
to each buyer’s share in production. 
We are deliberately leaving open the question of how
those targets might be met by the supplier. In some cases,
there may be changes to the way production is organized,
or the use of different material inputs, that might allow for
wage increases without increasing prices. In other cases,
buyers may need to increase prices to achieve the neces-
sary margins. However, in each case a collaborative effort
with the goal of increasing worker wages would be under-
taken. 
Where trade unions are present in a factory, they must be
involved in the process of negotiating measures to
increase wages and other compensation. 
Buyers, and/or multi-stakeholder initiatives to which buy-
ers belong, should monitor the process to ensure that
increases in wages are not met with decreases in other
monetary benefits or violations of other labour standards
such as hours of work provisions. 
XLVI. Collaboration to improve wages, however, may be limited by U.S. anti-trust provisions, so that work in this area must be done in a manner that
does not subject buyers to legal risks.
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Athletes set targets to better play their game. They set tar-
gets to meet and beat not only their competitors’ records,
but their own. Athletes aren’t content just to do as well as
their competitors, or to do as well as they did last month.
They shave seconds off their time, add kilograms to their
weights, contribute scores and assists to their team’s
records. When athletes fail to meet their targets, they can
lose the game, miss the shot, or drop the ball.
Sportswear companies set targets as well. They set per-
formance targets for their sales. They set targets for new
store openings or new market penetration. They set targets
for stock prices and other financial goals. By the time the
Vancouver Olympic Games start up in 2010, 
• Adidas hopes to double its retail outlets in mainland
China, generating approximately 1 billion Euros in annu-
al sales from China alone;
• Mizuno hopes to double its outlets in mainland China.
If those business targets are missed – sales stagnate,
stores don’t open, or stock prices don’t appreciate – senior
management can be held accountable. Some can even
lose their jobs for their failure to deliver.
And, as we have seen, sportswear manufacturers also set
targets for the number of pieces workers are expected to
complete each day. Workers often face consequences as a
result – in working hours, compensation, and stress. 
If sportswear companies can set specific, measurable tar-
gets for performance on production, sales and other finan-
cial goals, why can’t they set targets for worker rights? If
sportswear companies are serious about improving condi-
tions in the factories manufacturing their products, should-
n’t we have some way of charting success in real terms?
Four years ago, the Play Fair campaign asked the industry
to take up the challenge of making real, substantive
improvements in labour standards compliance by the
Beijing Olympics. With the Beijing Games just months
away, progress has been limited at best. 
If the sportswear industry – buyers, suppliers and the
multi-stakeholder initiatives that include them as members
– are serious about addressing the issues outlined in this
report, Play Fair 2008 challenges them to commit now to
undertake a set of actions with specific targets to ensure
that when the next Olympic Games come around in two
and four years’ time, workers can expect tangible improve-
ments in their wages and working conditions rather than
two or four years’ more talk about vague commitments. 
By focusing on increasing respect for freedom of associa-
tion and the right to bargain collectively, reducing the pre-
carious nature of employment in the industry, and by final-
ly taking action on “cash standards” like wages, sports-
wear companies can begin to transform the unsustainable
business model that has, despite years of corporate social
responsibility efforts, continued to perpetuate worker
rights abuses throughout the sportswear industry. 
The table in Appendix A sets out some practical actions the
industry can take to address the four main issues that have
been discussed earlier in this report. For each action, we
identify the primary actors, and some specific targets for
implementation. Brands and MSIs should set their own tar-
gets in the light of their own business realities and other
key performance indicators, but to begin a discussion we
suggest some potential minimum targets which we consid-
er to be very reasonable.
These actions are not the only things the industry needs to
do to address the central issues in their supply chains. The
Play Fair Alliance set out a comprehensive Programme of
Work for the Sportswear Industry in 2004.236 Play Fair 2008
has put forward a set of demands to various stakeholders,
including the IOC, governments and industry, that also
highlight the importance of living wages, a recognized
employment relationship, and concrete action regarding
freedom of association and collective bargaining.237 Over
100 organizations have endorsed those demands.
The actions proposed in this report, therefore, represent
detailed, practical steps that should be taken alongside
and as part of that broader program of action.
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